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FROM THE NE’ER-DO-WELL TO
THE CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY:
THE REFINEMENT OF THE ACTUARIAL
MODEL IN CRIMINAL LAW
BERNARD E. HARCOURT*
I
INTRODUCTION
Criminal law in the United States experienced radical change during the
course of the twentieth century.  The dawn of the century ushered in an era of
individualization of punishment.  Drawing on the new science of positive crimi-
nology, legal scholars called for diagnosis of the causes of delinquency and for
imposition of individualized courses of remedial treatment specifically adapted
to these diagnoses.  States gradually developed indeterminate sentencing
schemes that gave corrections administrators and parole boards wide discretion
over treatment and release decisions, and by 1970 every state in the country and
the federal government had adopted a system of indeterminate sentencing.1  At
the close of the century, the contrast could hardly have been greater.  Practi-
cally every state had repudiated in some way indeterminate sentencing and
imposed significant, in some cases complete, constraints on the discretion of
sentencing judges and parole boards.  In many states, parole boards were simply
abolished.  The period was marked by a new era of uniformity and consistency
in sentencing.2
The twentieth century also witnessed radical change in its prison popula-
tions.  The number of persons incarcerated in the United States increased dra-
matically during the last decades of the century, and the racial imbalance of the
incarcerated population increased steadily.  By 2001, the United States incar-
cerated roughly two million men and women in state and federal prisons and
jails,3 and, although African Americans represent approximately 13% of the
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1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2000 (2001) available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]
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general population, African-American men and women counted for 46.3% of
prisoners under state and federal jurisdiction by the year 2000.4
Legal scholars, economists, political and social theorists have offered
numerous interpretations to help explain these significant structural transfor-
mations.  Some claim that the changes were a rational response to the increas-
ing crime rates that began in the 1960s.5  Others contend that they were the
product of distorted perceptions of crime fueled primarily by, or inflamed by,
media attention and political initiative.6  Some claim that they were a response
to excessive judicial and prosecutorial discretion, discretion that often served to
mask racial discrimination.7  Still others claim that they reflect racial animus
expressed primarily through the War on Drugs and the targeting of inner-city
black communities.8  Some suggest that they are the product of a fundamental
(Table 6.1 and 6.27); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS, PRISONERS IN 2001 (2002),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/p01.html [hereinafter PRISONERS IN 2001].
4. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 3, at 488 (Table 6.2); PRISONERS IN 2001, supra note 3, at 11.
5. See generally William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion, in THE CRIME
DROP IN AMERICA  97, 123–125 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000) (reviewing the
literature on the incarceration–crime hypothesis and concluding that the prison build-up and increased
incarceration were responsible for approximately one quarter of the crime drop).  Several studies found
that increased incarceration reduced crime.  See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population
Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q. J. OF ECON. 319, 348
(1996) (“In the absence of strong alternatives to imprisonment at the present time, however, increased
reliance on incarceration appears to have been, and continue[s] to be, an effective approach to reducing
crime”); Patrick A. Langan, Between Prison and Probation: Intermediate Sanctions, SCIENCE, May 6,
1994, at 792–93 (“Tripling the prison population from 1975 to 1989 potentially reduced reported and
unreported violent crime by 10 to 15% below what it would have been, thereby potentially preventing a
conservatively estimated 390,000 murders, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults in 1989 alone.”).
6. See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 4–5, 14–27 (1997) [hereinafter BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY] (suggesting that
public concern about crime was the product of media attention and political anti-crime initiatives,
rather than crime rates, and that the resulting crackdown on crime was a socially and politically engi-
neered response); KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBATZ, CRIME IN THE PUBLIC MIND 5–8 (1995) (suggesting
that public opinion, fueled by media exaggeration, became increasingly tough on crime despite steady
crime rates since 1973, and that politicians and policy makers escalated the get-tough rhetoric and
responded with a crackdown on crime); MIKE A. MALES, FRAMING YOUTH: TEN MYTHS ABOUT THE
NEXT GENERATION (1999) (arguing that the media and academics have produced a misleading picture
of contemporary youths that has fueled punitive responses). Critics of the incarceration–crime hypothe-
sis generally focus on the National Crime Victimization Survey data, rather than the FBI’s Uniform
Crime Reports.  See, e.g., GAUBATZ, supra, at 8 (“In the years since 1973, when reliable data on
national victimization rates began to be collected annually, rates of violent crime have been held
remarkably steady, while rates of both household crime and personal theft have dropped signifi-
cantly.”).
7. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1988) (discussing Congress’ central purposes in enacting
the federal sentencing guidelines, including reducing racial and gender disparities associated with
excessive sentencing discretion).  See generally MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 54–58
(1996) [hereinafter TONRY, SENTENCING] (discussing claims of racial disparities in state sentencing
schemes such as Minnesota, Washington, and Oregon); James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge
Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 275–77
n.20 (1999) (discussing how claims of racial disparities in sentencing helped fuel the federal sentencing
guidelines).
8. See, e.g., JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 62–88 (1996) (suggesting that the War on Drugs fueled the explosion in
the carceral population and exacerbated racial bias already present in the criminal justice system); THE
REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 107–24
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shift in our democracy from a social welfare to a penal state—a state that man-
ages the underclass no longer through welfare programs but by means of incar-
ceration.9  And others contend that the changes reflect a shift in the final dec-
ades of the twentieth century toward a new mode of bureaucratic management
of crime—a new probabilistic or actuarial episteme—involving a style of thought
that emphasized aggregation, probabilities, and risk calculation instead of indi-
vidualized determination.10
In this essay, I explore another possible interpretation.  It is an interpreta-
tion that focuses on the will to know the criminal, on the desire to predict his
criminality.  It is an interpretation that pays close attention to the deep drive to
operationalize and model future criminal activity in the most parsimonious way,
to the will to better predict the probability of criminality, to the search for more
efficient responses to the expected occurrence of crime.  Is it possible that these
powerful desires have somehow contributed to the structural transformation of
criminal law and punishment during the twentieth century?  To explore this
question, I investigate in Part III of this essay three developments in twentieth
century criminal law: the evolution of parole board decision-making in the early
twentieth century, the development of fixed sentencing guidelines in the late
twentieth century, and the growth of criminal profiling as a formal law
enforcement tool since the 1960s.  In each of these case studies, I focus narrowly
on the criminal law decision-making.  My interest is in exploring the role of
(Steven A. Donziger ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE REAL WAR ON CRIME] (discussing the War on Drugs
and its impact on black communities); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 79–80 (1995) [hereinafter TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT] (suggesting that,
since 1980, the War on Drugs and other tough-on-crime measures deliberately contributed to the
steady worsening of racial disparities in the justice system); Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis:
Rethinking Race and Imprisonment in Twenty-First-Century America, BOSTON REV., April–May 2002,
at 23 (“[T]he astounding upsurge in black incarceration in the past three decades results from the
obsolescence of the ghetto as a device for caste control and the correlative need for a substitute appara-
tus for keeping (unskilled) African Americans in a subordinate and confined position—physically,
socially, and symbolically.”).
9. See, e.g., BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY, supra note 6, at 10 (discussing “the effort to replace
social welfare with social control as the principle of state policy”); Loïc Wacquant, L’ascension de l’État
pénal en Amérique, 124 ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 7 (1998), as well as the arti-
cles collected in that Symposium issue titled De l’État Social à l’État Pénal in 124 ACTES DE LA
RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES (September 1998).  For discussion of the separate thesis of the
rise of the prison-industrial complex, see, for example THE REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 8, at 85–
87.
10. See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 450–52 (1992) (suggesting that a
new paradigm for the management of dangerous persons has emerged in the late-twentieth century,
accompanied by a new language of penology); JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND
THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 (1993) [hereinafter SIMON, POOR
DISCIPLINE] (exploring this “new penology” through the historical development of parole in
California); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on
the Past Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (discussing the
“new penology” and suggesting that “one can discern this new penology in sentencing guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentences that allocate punishment wholesale rather than retail”); Stuart A.
Scheingold, Constructing the New Political Criminology: Power, Authority, and the Post-Liberal State,
23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 857, 866–69, 882–86 (1998) (discussing the role of the “new penology”).
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actuarial methods in legal practice as opposed to criminological, sociological, or
other social scientific practice.
The case studies reveal a gradual development and refinement of the actu-
arial methods deployed in criminal law over the course of the twentieth century.
The statistical methods narrowed in on certain key predictors of crime—most
specifically, on the prior criminal history of the convict.  Over time, fewer and
fewer factors were taken into account, and by the end of the twentieth century
most of the statistical tools focused narrowly on offense characteristics and
prior delinquency, rather than on the social, familial, and neighborhood back-
ground variables that had been such an integral part of the rehabilitative con-
cept.  That  a clinical11 model prevailed during the early decades of the twentieth
century was due primarily to scarcity of resources, not to lack of will.
Inadequate funding of criminal justice institutions delayed the deployment of
actuarial predictive tools in criminal law, but not for long.  Functioning statisti-
cal models were realized and put in place relatively quickly—in some instances,
by the early 1930s.  The development in criminal law, then, is neither an evolu-
tion from a romantic ideal of individualism to an actuarial model, nor a gradual
shift from a clinical to a statistical episteme.  It is, instead, the development and
refinement of an actuarial approach to criminal law that was the kernel of the
turn to individualization in the early twentieth century, that initially took the
shape of a clinical model by default, and that gradually matured into the style of
criminal law characteristic of the early twenty-first century.
Did the thirst for knowledge and desire for prediction contribute to the
structural transformation of the criminal law in the twentieth century?  More
specifically, has the refinement of the actuarial models used in criminal law, in
the context of scarce law enforcement resources, contributed to the increased
racial imbalance in prison?  Has it contributed to the theoretical shift during the
twentieth century from the individualization of punishment to incapacitation
theory?  I address the first of these questions in Part IV of this essay—with a
focus on criminal profiling and, specifically, racial profiling—and I raise the
second in a short conclusion.
II
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN CRIMINAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
A. The Individualization of Punishment
The turn of the twentieth century was marked by a strong aspiration toward
the individualization of punishment.  On the Continent, Raymond Saleilles, a
11. By clinical, I am referring to a model of prediction or diagnosis that relies primarily on the
subjective judgment of experienced decision-makers.  See generally PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL
VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 4
(1963).  Clinical here is opposed to statistical or actuarial, by which I mean a model of prediction that
relies on “the mechanical combining of information for classification purposes, and the resultant prob-
ability figure which is an empirically determined relative frequency.”  Id. at 3.
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prominent French jurist, published The Individualization of Punishment in 1898,
observing that “[t]here is today a general movement having as its object the
goal of detaching the law from purely abstract formulas which seemed, to the
general public at least, to divorce the law from human contact.”12  This general
movement represented the culmination—and wedding—of progress in crimi-
nology and justice in law, or what Saleilles called “sociological criminology
adapted to the idea of justice.”13  It reflected a new orientation of judicial insti-
tutions and practices toward the individualization of punishment.  “One cannot
fix punishment in advance in a rigid or strict manner, nor legally regulate it in
an inflexible manner, since the purpose of punishment is an individual one that
must be achieved by means of specific policies appropriate to the circumstances,
rather than by the application of a purely abstract law ignoring the varieties of
cases presented,” Saleilles declared.14  “This adaptation of punishment to the
individual is what we call, today, the individualization of punishment.”15  In the
emerging field of sociology, Emile Durkheim identified two laws concerning the
evolution of punishment and traced the second law—namely, that punishment
consists increasingly of the deprivation of liberty for varying terms—to the indi-
vidualization of responsibility in more developed societies.  As “responsibility
becomes more individual,” Durkheim observed, punishment is focused
increasingly on the subject, in a graduated manner.16  Modern societies were
marked by the salience of the individual.
A similar development characterized British penality at the beginning of the
twentieth century.17  The modern break in England—a break from the Victorian
penal system—can be traced to the period 1895 to 1914.  The earlier Victorian
penal system, well in place by the 1860s, was marked by increased reliance on
the prison as the primary mode of sanctioning, but its focus on the prison was
not individually tailored to the convict.  “[A]lthough Victorian prisons exhibited
a close and detailed form of discipline or ‘dressage’, they did not manifest a
concern with individualisation.  On the contrary, each individual was treated
‘exactly alike’, with no reference being made to his or her criminal type or indi-
vidual character.”18  It was also marked by a legal formalist view: punishment in
the period was viewed exclusively as a legal event, one which had no room for
other disciplinary knowledges like psychiatry, sociology, medicine or econom-
12. RAYMOND SALEILLES, L’INDIVIDUALISATION DE LA PEINE: ÈTUDE DE CRIMINALITÉ
SOCIALE 5 (1898) (translation by author).
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 12–13.
15. Id.
16. Émile Durkheim, Deux Lois de L’Évolution Pénale, in L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE, 1900, 81
(1901).  The first penal law is that the intensity of punishment diminishes in more advanced and less
autocratic societies.
17. See generally DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE (1985).
18. Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).
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ics.19  This Victorian model was displaced during the early twentieth century by
penological modernism.20  The range of sanctions was expanded to include pro-
bation and various types of reformatory institutions, and new agencies were
created to administer these forms of correction.  The objectives of the penal
system diversified, and there developed “a general objective . . . of assessment
and classification.”21  Psychiatric and medical judgments were allowed to inform
these processes.  The goal was to individualize punishment.  This produced “a
move from individualism to individualisation, which alter[ed] the penal field
fundamentally.”22
In the United States, legal scholars and positivist criminologists joined
efforts to identify the causes of crime and to prescribe individualized treatment.
The National Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology, held in Chicago in
1909, marked this turn to individualization.  In a statement representing the
views of the core legal academics, professors Ernst Freund, Roscoe Pound,
John Henry Wigmore, and their colleagues announced a new era of individual-
ized, remedial, penal treatment that would address the individual causes of
crime in each and every delinquent.23  According to these scholars, the new sci-
ence of crime had deep implications for criminal law: “Modern science recog-
nizes that penal or remedial treatment cannot possibly be indiscriminate and
machine-like, but must be adapted to the causes, and to the man as affected by
those causes,” they declared.24  “Thus the great truth of the present and the
future, for criminal science, is the individualization of penal treatment,—for
that man, and for the cause of that man’s crime.”25
Roscoe Pound wrote an introduction to the American translation of Ray-
mond Saleilles’ book, which appeared in 1911, and announced the need for
greater individualization of punishment in the United States.  “What we have to
achieve, then, in modern criminal law is a system of individualization,” Pound
declared.26  “More recently throughout the world there has come to be a reac-
tion against administration of justice solely by abstract formula,” Pound
explained.27  “In the United States it is manifest in a tendency toward extra-legal
19. The ideology of punishment was closely connected to that of the liberal political state, which
does not intervene to cure or rehabilitate, but rather performs the minimal state task of meting out
punishment for violations of a social compact.  Id  at 18.
20. See David Garland, Penal Modernism and Postmodernism, in PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL
CONTROL: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHELDON L. MESSINGER 181, 186–87 (Thomas G. Blomberg &
Stanley Cohen eds., 1995).
21. Garland, supra note 13, at 24 (emphasis in original).
22. Id. at 28 (emphasis in original).
23. John H. Wigmore et al., General Introduction to the Modern Criminal Science Series, in
RAYMOND SALEILLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT, vii (Rachel Szold Jastrow trans.
1911) (1898).  See generally, Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of
Pound: An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915, 1949–1964 (1995).
24. Wigmore et al., supra note 24, at vii.
25. Id.
26. Roscoe Pound, Introduction to the English Version, in SALEILLES, INDIVIDUALIZATION OF
PUNISHMENT, supra note 23, at xvii (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at xv.
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attainment of just results while preserving the form of the law. . . .  The move-
ment for individualization in criminal law is but a phase of this general move-
ment for individualizing the application of all legal rules.”28
The notion of individualization of punishment rested on the newly discov-
ered correlations between criminality and home conditions, physical traits,
genetic make-up, and neighborhood environment.  These correlations offered
an alternative to the classical or utilitarian model of crime, which emphasized
the rational decision-making process of the delinquent and the need to calibrate
the cost of crime to the expected gain from the delinquent behavior.  The new
era of individualization gave rise to departments of corrections, the juvenile
court, and treatment and rehabilitation programs—in sum, to the rehabilitative
project.  By 1970, the aspiration toward individualized sentencing had led every
state to adopt a system of indeterminate sentencing.  Legislatures would set
maximum sentences, inmates would become eligible for parole after serving
about a third of the maximum sentence, and parole boards would decide when
inmates were released.  Minimum sentences imposed by the legislature were
rare and generally frowned upon.  Judges had wide discretion over whether to
impose probation or imprisonment.29
B. Uniformity, Consistency, and Proportionality
At the end of the twentieth century, the field of crime and punishment was
characterized by a different set of markers.  The rehabilitative project of the
early and mid-twentieth century gradually faded away, replaced in the latter
third of the twentieth century by fixed sentencing schemes.  By the mid-1990s,
the shift in sentencing could hardly have been more striking.  “Beginning with
Maine’s abolition of parole in 1975, nearly every state has in some ways repudi-
ated indeterminate sentencing and recast sentencing policies to set standards
for judges’ and parole boards’ decisions and thereby to narrow or eliminate
their discretion.”30  Led by Minnesota and Pennsylvania in the 1970s, and then
by the federal government in 1984, most jurisdictions turned to sentencing
guidelines or other mechanisms—such as statutory determinate sentencing—to
constrain judicial sentencing.  In 1994, Congress enacted legislation condition-
ing billions of dollars in grants to states on their adopting sentencing guidelines,
eliminating parole, and ensuring that individuals served at least 85 percent of
their sentence.  By 1996, “[f]ifteen jurisdictions had adopted sentencing guide-
lines to limit judicial discretion; more than ten had eliminated parole release;
another twenty-five had adopted parole guidelines; many had narrowed the
ambit of good time; and all had enacted mandatory minimum sentence legisla-
tion (often requiring minimum ten-, twenty- or thirty-year terms and sometimes
mandatory sentences of life-without-possibility-of-parole).”31
28. Id. at xv–xvi.
29. See TONRY, SENTENCING, supra note 7, at 6.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id. at 6–7.
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The new constraints on discretion include mandatory minimum penalties,
firearm and other sentencing enhancements, fixed sentencing guidelines,
repeat-offender statutes such as “three-strikes-and-you’re-out” laws, habitual
offender enhancements, and a system of guidelines for state parole authorities.32
The focus on categories (and subtypes) of crime, rather than on individual
causes of crime, is captured well by the federal firearm enhancement statute.33
The statute provides in part that any person who carries a firearm in connection
with a crime of violence or drug trafficking shall be sentenced to an additional
enhancement of, for instance, not less than ten years if the firearm is “a short-
barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon,” and
not less than thirty years if the firearm is “a machinegun or a destructive device,
or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler.”34  A second or subse-
quent conviction involving the latter type of firearm is to be punished by life
imprisonment.35
Many of these developments were initiated at the federal level.  At the same
time, Congress steadily expanded the number of federal crimes.  Whereas the
federal criminal code contained 183 separate offenses in 1873, by 2000 it was
estimated to contain three thousand offenses.36  The expansion of the federal
criminal code was accompanied by increased federal enforcement of traditional
police powers through law enforcement initiatives such as “Project Exile” in
Richmond, Virginia, which federalized the prosecution of state gun offences.37
Law enforcement also witnessed a gradual shift toward the increased use of
criminal profiling.  Criminal profiling is generally traced to the mid-twentieth
century,38 although arguably it has antecedents in the early twentieth century
32. See generally, YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS
AND QUESTIONS, 1498–1502 (10th ed. 2002); KATE STITH AND JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF
JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998); UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(1991); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, 3 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT]; Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines Are “Alive and Well” in the United States in
SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES—A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 12 (Michael
Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(i) and (ii).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(ii).
36. See Tom Stacy and Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 247, 251 n.19 (1997); William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 513–515, n.32 (2001).  This occurred during a period of steady increases in the number of
state crimes.  In Illinois, for instance, the criminal code has grown from 131 separate crimes in 1856 to
421 at the turn of the twenty-first century; in Virginia, the criminal code mushroomed from 170 offenses
to 495 over the same period; and in Massachusetts, from 214 crimes to 535.  See Stuntz, supra, at 513–
515.
37. “Project Exile” was conceived and implemented in 1996, and has been expanded in the twenty-
first century into a national exile program under the rubric “Project Safe Neighborhood.”  See gener-
ally, Daniel C. Richman, ‘Project Exile’ and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, in
GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (Bernard E. Harcourt ed. 2003).
38. See, e.g., Milton Heumann & Lance Cassak, Profiles in Justice?  Police Discretion, Symbolic
Assailants, and Stereotyping, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 911, 916 (2001) (“Profiling as a separate and distinct
law enforcement technique began in the mid-twentieth century and developed along two lines.”).
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eugenics movement.  The basic idea is to develop correlations between specific
criminal activity and group-based traits in order to help law enforcement iden-
tify potential suspects for investigation.  An early instance of criminal profiling
involved the hijacker profiles that were developed in the 1960s to disrupt the
hijacking of American commercial airplanes.39  Criminal profiling became more
frequent in the 1970s with drug-courier profiles and alien smuggling profiles,
and was used increasingly in the last quarter of the twentieth century.40  The
turn to profiling reflects an overall shift from the earlier reform model of “pro-
fessional” policing.  This earlier model traced back to August Vollmer’s tenure
as police chief in Berkeley beginning in 1905 and to the 1931 Wickersham
Commission report condemning police corruption and brutality.41  It was charac-
terized by a strategy of rapid response to 911 calls.  And it was displaced by the
crime prevention models of the late twentieth century—what I have referred to
elsewhere as the order-maintenance approach to criminal justice.42  The order-
maintenance approach relies heavily on offender profiles to target stop-and-
frisk encounters and misdemeanor arrests, to disperse gang members, to stop
drug couriers and illegal immigrants, and to control the disorderly.
C. Carceral Trends
The twentieth century was also marked by an exponential increase in the
number of persons in federal and state prisons and local jails, and under federal
and state supervision. Federal and state prison populations nationwide grew
from less than 200,000 in 1970 to more than 1,300,000 in 2001, with another
600,000 persons held in local jails (see Figure 1).43  In New York City, where
order maintenance was aggressively implemented in 1994 under the administra-
tion of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and his first police commissioner, William
Bratton, the policing strategy produced an immediate surge in arrests for mis-
demeanor offenses (see Figure 2).
39. DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK, 17
(2002).
40. See generally id. at 10–11, 17–26.
41. Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF
FORCE, 43–48, 174–184 (1993).
42. See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001).
43. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 3, at tables 6.1 and 6.27; PRISONERS IN 2001, supra note 3, at 2.
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In addition, African Americans began to represent an increasing proportion
of the supervised population.  Since 1926, the year the federal government
began collecting data on correctional populations, the proportion of African
Americans newly admitted to state prisons has increased steadily from 23.1 %
to 45.8% in 1982; it reached 51.8% in 1991, and stood at 47% in 1997 (see Figure
3).44  In 1997, nine percent of all adult African Americans were under correc-
tional supervision in this country, in contrast to two percent of European
Americans.45  The trend from 1984 to 1997 is reflected in Figure 4, which repre-
sents the percentage of adult populations in state and federal prisons and local
44. For statistics from 1926 to 1982, see Patrick A. Langan, Racism on Trial: New Evidence to Ex-
plain the Racial Composition of Prisons in the United States, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 666, 667
(1985); for statistics from 1985 to 1989, see U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995, Table 1.16 (1997); for statistics from 1990 to 1997, see
U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1997,
at 10, Table 1.20 (2000) [hereinafter CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS].
45. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 3, at 488, table 6.2.
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jails by race and gender as a proportion of their representation in the general
population.46
III
CASE STUDIES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY CRIMINAL LAW
46. CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, supra note 44, at 4, figure 1.  For excellent discussions of these
trends, see TONRY; MALIGN NEGLECT, supra note 8, at 28–31, 56–68 (1995); See also JUSTICE POLICY
INSTITUTE, CELLBLOCKS OR CLASSROOMS?: THE FUNDING OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND
CORRECTIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON AFRICAN AMERICAN MEN (2002) available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/coc1/corc. htm (last visited May 5, 2003).
FIGURE 3:
RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF ADMISSIONS TO STATE
PRISONS, 1926–1997
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III
CASE STUDIES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY CRIMINAL LAW
How can we even begin to understand the significant structural transforma-
tions of the criminal law field during the twentieth century? In this essay,
drawing on three case studies, I explore a possible link between the structural
changes and the refinement of the actuarial methods used in the criminal law.
The place to start to frame the case studies is the original turn to individuali-
zation of punishment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  It is
important to emphasize that this movement itself was the product of actuarial
aspirations.  The search for statistical regularity precedes these case studies,
and, somewhat paradoxically, helped bring about the very turn to individualiza-
tion that marked the early period.  The desire to know the criminal and better
predict his criminality triggered the modern reform movement.
As Ian Hacking persuasively demonstrates in The Taming of Chance, the
laws of probability largely had displaced the laws of necessity in much of West-
ern discourse by the late nineteenth century, especially in the area of crime and
punishment.47  The erosion of determinism during the nineteenth century did
not give way to chaos or indeterminism, but instead to the laws of chance and
probability, to the bell-shaped curve. Paradoxically, the transition produced
even greater control over the physical and social environment.  As Hacking
explains:
There is a seeming paradox: the more the indeterminism, the more the control.
This is obvious in the physical sciences.  Quantum physics take for granted that nature
is at bottom irreducibly stochastic.  Precisely that discovery has immeasurably
enhanced our ability to interfere with and alter the course of nature.  A moment’s
reflection shows that a similar statement may be attempted in connection with people.
The parallel was noticed quite early.  Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founding fathers of
quantitative psychology, wrote as early as 1862: “It is statistics that first demonstrated
that love follows psychological laws.”48
Hacking relates statistical progress to a parallel phenomenon, namely the
proliferation and publication of printed numbers beginning in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, but flourishing during and after the Napoleonic era.49
The proliferation of numbers helped create the categories of the normal, crimi-
nal, and pathological in the nineteenth century.50  As Jack Katz similarly has
suggested, these categories took hold as a product of historical and political-
institutional forces; rarely, if ever, a result of causal social theory.51  But for our
purposes here, the important point is that the paradigm shift took place during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and was practically complete by the
turn of the twentieth century.  “The cardinal concept of the psychology of the
47. IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE, 1–8 (1990).
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 27–34.
50. Id. at 160–169.
51. JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN DOING EVIL
43 (1988).
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Enlightenment had been, simply, human nature,” Hacking explains.52  “By the
end of the nineteenth century, it was being replaced by something different:
normal people.”53  Laws of chance had become autonomous—not irreducible,
but autonomous in the sense that they could be used not only to predict but also
to explain phenomena.
Most of these laws of chance were first observed, recorded, and publicized
in the area of delinquence—crime, suicide, madness, prostitution.  Adolphe
Quetelet, the great Belgian statistician, would write as early as 1832 of the sta-
tistical regularities concerning crime.54  He described the phenomenon as a
“kind of budget for the scaffold, the galleys and the prisons, achieved by the
French nation with greater regularity, without doubt, than the financial
budget.”55  Karl Pearson, the famous statistician and eugenicist who assisted
Charles Goring at the turn of the twentieth century, would summarize Goring’s
findings about “the English criminal as he really is” as “not absolutely differen-
tiated by numerous anomalies from the general population, but relatively dif-
ferentiated from the mean or population type, because on the average he is
selected from the physically poorer and mentally feebler portion of the general
population.56  The criminal,” Pearson explained, “is not a random sample of the
general population, either physically or mentally.  He is, rather, a sample of the
less fit moiety of it.”57  Many years before that, Madame de Staël would observe
that “there are cities in Italy where one can calculate exactly how many murders
will be committed from year to year.”58  The first inroads into chance were made
in the area of crime and punishment.
And these laws of chance were precisely what grounded the era of individu-
alization in punishment at the turn of the twentieth century.  The movement
was premised on the new science of crime—on the idea that there are identifi-
able causes of crime that we could discover and study.  The National Confer-
ence of 1909, which gave rise to the American Institute of Criminal Law and
Criminology, was an outgrowth of the statistical discoveries emerging from
positive criminology.  Ernst Freund, Roscoe Pound and their colleagues
explained:
This truth opens up a vast field for re-examination.  It means that we must study all
the possible data that can be causes of crime,—the man’s heredity, the man’s physical
and moral make-up, his emotional temperament, the surroundings of his youth, his
present home, and other conditions,—all the influencing circumstances.  And it means
that the effect of different methods of treatment, old or new, for different kinds of men
52. HACKING, supra note 47, at 1.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 105.
55. Id.
56. Karl Pearson, Charles Goring and his Contributions to Criminology, in CHARLES GORING,
THE ENGLISH CONVICT: A STATISTICAL STUDY, ix, xii–xiii (1919).
57. Id.
58. Quoted in HACKING, supra note 47, at 41 (quoting de Staël’s conclusion that this demonstrates
that “events which depend on a multitude of diverse combinations have a periodic recurrence, a fixed
proportion, when the observations result from a large number of chances”).
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and of causes, must be studied, experimented and compared.  Only in this way can accu-
rate knowledge be reached, and new efficient measures be adopted.59
The development and refinement of criminology in the nineteenth century
was tied primarily to progress in statistical methods and analysis, and to the
collection and accumulation of statistical data.  Freund, Pound and their col-
leagues, in fact, lamented the delay it had taken for American criminal juris-
prudence to embrace the statistical paradigm.
All this has been going on in Europe for forty years past, and in limited fields in this
country.  All the branches of science that can help have been working,—anthropology,
medicine, psychology, economics, sociology, philanthropy, penology.  The law alone
has abstained.  The science of law is the one to be served by all this.60
The individualization movement, in this sense, rested on a probabilistic
model that attempted to predict the likely success of different treatment inter-
ventions based on inferences from an accumulation of data points about a par-
ticular individual.  The turn to individualization rested on probabilities and
actuarial methods.  This insight represents an important lens through which we
must explore the three case studies.
A. The Emergence of Parole
At the turn of the twentieth century, the ideal of individualized punishment
was carried out predominantly by means of indeterminate sentencing and dele-
gation of authority to parole boards. Judges essentially extricated themselves
from the day-to-day business of individualization by sentencing convicted
offenders to a wide range of imprisonment and affording corrections adminis-
trators and parole boards wide discretion to decide about rehabilitation and
release.
The early parole practices in the state of Illinois were the subject of detailed
study and offer a good illustration of the development of parole.  In 1927 and
1928, sociology professor Ernest Burgess of the University of Chicago, law pro-
fessor Andrew Bruce of Northwestern University, and Dean Albert Harno of
the University of Illinois College of Law conducted extensive research on
parole procedures at the request of the chairman of the Illinois parole board.
Two other researchers—who would play important roles in the subsequent his-
tory of parole in Illinois—were made part of the research team: John Landesco,
described as “an expert in vocational education and an experienced student in
criminology,”61 was appointed as a field worker in the study, and Clark Tibbitts
was selected “as research assistant upon certain special phases of the subject.”62
The research project involved, among other things, extensive interviews, study
of parole records, a review of the entire criminal and penal records of three
thousand paroled men, and physical visits to the penal institutions.  It resulted
59. Wigmore et al., supra note 23, at vii (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Letter of Transmission in Andrew A. Bruce et al., A Study of the Indeterminate Sentence and
Parole in the State of Illinois, 19 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5 (1928).
62. Id.
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in a 306-page report published in the Journal of the American Institute of Crimi-
nal Law and Criminology in May 1928.63
In Illinois, indeterminate sentencing replaced fixed sentencing gradually
over the course of the late nineteenth century.  The first sightings of the idea of
parole occurred in the context of a juvenile reform school for boys in 1867, and
was formalized for male juvenile offenders in 1891 and for female juvenile
offenders in 1893.  For adults, good-time allowances began to surface around
1863, and a general adult parole system was enacted in 1895.  Indeterminate
sentencing was enacted by the Illinois legislature in 1917 (for crimes other than
misprision of treason, murder, rape and kidnapping) to make the parole system
effective.64  By the time of the writing of the Report in 1928, the idea of inde-
terminate sentencing was well established.  As law professor Andrew Bruce
declared, somewhat enthusiastically:
The wisdom of the policy of indeterminate sentence and the parole, if properly
administered, is now almost universally recognized, not only in America, but through-
out the civilized world.  The policy can hardly any longer be classed as a product of
unenlightened sentimentalism.
In 1922 only four states of the American Union were without either the indeter-
minate sentence or the parole system.  In 1925 the laws of forty-six of the forty-eight
American states made definite provision for the release of prisoners on parole, only
Mississippi and Virginia having no such laws.
In 1925 also, the International Prison Commission, meeting in London with fifty-
three nations represented, adopted a resolution favoring the indeterminate sentence
and the parole laws and recommending their adoption to the Governments of the
civilized world.65
This ideal account of the parole system, however, was marred at first by the
lack of resources and adequate staffing.  The Illinois parole system was severely
short staffed until at least 1927.  The 1897 act, which created indeterminate sen-
tencing in Illinois, provided for the creation of a state board of pardons consist-
ing of three persons.66  These three persons were charged with overseeing all
paroles in the Illinois system.  This lasted until 1917 when the legislature
created a Department of Public Welfare and incorporated the board of pardons
and paroles as a subdivision;67 however, the legislation did not state who should
compose the parole board, and the responsibility for determining parole fell
entirely on the supervisor of paroles and three appointed assistants.68  With over
seven thousand persons incarcerated in the mid-1920s, the parole process was
haphazard at best.  The board was not able to review all the cases and would
only cursorily review those it did, spending two or three minutes with the
63. See id. at 281.
64. Id. at 42–43, 50, 51; see also Attorney General’s Survey of Release Procedures, DIGEST OF
FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS ON RELEASE PROCEDURES, 311 (1939) (tracing the history of parole in
Illinois from its inception in 1891 to 1939) [hereinafter Attorney General’s Survey].
65. Bruce et al., supra note 61, at 63.
66. Id. at 53, 57; see also Attorney General’s Survey, supra note 64, at 310 n.3.
67. See Attorney General’s Survey, supra note 64, at 311.
68. Bruce et al., supra note 61, at 57, 84.
HARCOURT_FMT_2.DOC 05/29/03  9:43 AM
114 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:99
inmate and reading primarily the state’s statement and the synopsis of the case.
The parole board had little time to spend with any one case and the materials
they received were often a jumbled mess.  The Report indicates that researchers
found the material in the ‘jackets’ in confusion.  No effort had been made to file in
orderly sequence and no list or inventory was kept with the ‘jackets’ of the documents
and papers they contained.  All the material was merely jammed in together. . . . often
it took a member of the [research team] a day, sometimes two and even three days, to
disentangle the mass of material in one of these jackets, to rearrange it, and to read
and digest it.69
According to the Report, few inmates were paroled, and those who were, were
“‘guessed out of’ prison.”70  “The responsibility imposed on the Supervisor and
the labor required of him by such numbers was too great.  It was resulting,” the
Report concluded, “in superficiality.”71
Lack of resources and short staffing were not unique to Illinois, but were
common among state parole agencies.  The parole system in California, for
instance, was initiated in about 1893.  Although parole began to be used
increasingly—with the percentage of releases through parole increasing from
7% in 1907 to 35% in 1914—it was not until 1914 that a state parole officer was
appointed.72  It took another fifteen years for a field staff to be assembled.73  “In
California supervision was largely a matter of paperwork since there was no
real field staff until the 1930s, except for the single parole officer headquartered
in San Francisco.”74  Most other states suffered from understaffed, resource-
deprived parole organizations that did not fulfill the promise of rehabilitation.
As David Rothman has written regarding the parole system in the Progressive
Era:
No sooner does one plunge into the realities of parole than the question of its persis-
tence is further complicated, for one uncovers almost everywhere a dismal record of
performance.  Neither of the two essential tasks of parole, the fixing of prison release
time or post-sentence supervision, was carried out with any degree of competence or
skill.  Amateurs on parole boards reached their decisions hastily and almost unthink-
ingly, while overworked and undertrained parole officers did little more than keep a
formal but useless file on the activities of their charges.  Whatever the reasons for the
survival of parole, they will not be found in the efficient or diligent administration of
the system.75
Returning to Illinois, the legislature passed a bill in 1927 at the urging of the
supervisor of paroles, directing that the parole board consist of a supervisor and
nine members.  A separate appropriation was made for this board, which
allowed for, among other things, investigators to conduct field work on the out-
69. Id. at 85.
70. Id. at 84.
71. Id. at 87.
72. SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, supra note 10, at 48–49.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 53.
75. DAVID ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA, 162 (1980).
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side regarding parole candidates.76  This expanded board formed sub-commit-
tees of three members that sat three days per week at the three separate
primary institutions in Illinois—Joliet, Menard, and Pontiac.77  The sub-
committees at the institutions, and then the full committee reviewing the
recommendation, would consider whether parole was appropriate.
When these additional resources and staffing were made available, the deci-
sion to parole began to approximate a clinical judgment.  It rested on empirical
data, and represented a subjective judgment as to whether the individual would
be a good candidate for parole. In response to the question, “On what princi-
pally do you base your judgment in granting or refusing a parole?,” the chair of
the parole board explained:
First, the man’s history; his education; his apparent mentality; his physical condition;
his attitude towards discipline and toward society, as evidenced by his institutional
record.  In addition to that, his former habits; his associates; the environment under
which he grew up; all the facts and circumstances relating to the man’s history before
he committed the crime, so far as it is available to us, his commission of the crime and
his conduct since and while being punished; and his learning of one or more useful
trades while confined.  His attendance at school or church in the institution, and
finally our own conclusion after talking to the prisoner in great detail and examining
him several times before he is given a final parole.
It is very rarely the case that we talk to a prisoner less than three or four times
now before he is given his final parole, so your question is a hard question to answer.
It is the net collected judgment of the ten men after reviewing all the facts and circum-
stances with reference to the individual.  In other words, we try to fit the punishment
and the scheme of reformation to the individual and not the crime after the inmate or
the prisoner has served what is believed to be a reasonable punishment, as a deterrent
to others, or other would-be criminals, for the crime committed.78
To give a flavor of the written rationale offered by the board, here are two
examples of the reports from the sub-committees:
A member of this Committee [research team] has read several hundred of the sub-
committee’s reports.  The following may be taken as typical: “(No.) . . . . . . . . . .,
(name) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Received . . . . . . . . ., 1923, from . . . . . . . . . . County
upon a plea of guilty to buaglary (sic) and larceny.  Paroled, conditional that he be
deported to Canada and that the authorities come after him.  He is a Canadian.  Did
one term in the Ontario prison.  Has been in this institution more than four years and
we believe he is now entitled to release.  There is in the record the necessary orders
for his deportation to Canada, both our own government and the Canadian govern-
ment having consummated arrangements for bringing that about whenever he is
released by the Illinois authorities.
“(No.) . . . . . . . . . . .  (Name) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Received . . . . . . . . . ., 1926,
from . . . . . . . . . . County upon plea of guilty to burglary and larceny.  Not ready for
parole.  Young . . . . . . . . . . has done a term at the Vandalia State Farm, was once tried
and acquitted for the killing of his step-father.  He is regarded by the authorities as a
pretty bad young man.  We have paroled his associate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., because
he has had no previous record, but we feel that this boy should have a substantial
76. Bruce et al., supra note 61, at 58–59, 90–91.
77. Id. at 90.
78. Id. at 93.
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lesson to the end that he will learn that he cannot do the things that he has been doing
so flagrantly.”79
These “typical” subcommittee reports are revealing, and not terribly
impressive.  The reality of the parole decisions is that they turned in large part
on the state attorney’s statement to the parole board.  As the Report noted, “no
recommendations, evidence or other material that come before the Parole
Board have greater influence with it than the statements concerning prisoner
coming from the trial judges and the State’s Attorneys.”80  And these statements
from the judge and state’s attorney were, in the view of the research team, most
often inadequate to address issues of rehabilitation and often factually wrong.
In addition, there was an important political dimension to the decision to
parole.  The research team found that a large number of the jackets contained
evidence of lawyers employed to obtain favorable parole decisions or “of a
prominent politician at work on the case.”81  “[T]here is abundant evidence in
the records that the efforts of those who are induced to champion the cause of
the prisoner are often placed upon other grounds than those of the facts.”82
The research team expressed some skepticism about the parole board’s
functioning, suggesting that some of its rationales and written reports “lacked
discrimination”83 and were somewhat impressionistic.  Dean Harno recom-
mended “respectfully” that the parole board members “become thorough stu-
dents of the theory of parole” and that “the mastering of the theory will materi-
ally enrich their judgment.”84  The research team hinted that the data on which
the parole board made its decisions was often “very scanty,” and suggested that
the board conduct more independent investigation to obtain a full dossier on
the individuals.  “With more funds at its disposal than formerly,” Dean Harno
emphasized, “the Board needs to put skilled investigators with training in soci-
ology and social work on the job to get this information.  The Committee com-
mends this to the Board as an essential feature supplementing the other mate-
rial it has at its disposal.”85
Professor Ernest Burgess went further and recommended an even more sci-
entific approach.  Burgess conducted a study of three thousand inmates paroled
in the four-to-five years prior to December 31, 1924,86 and explored whether
there was any statistical relationship between success on parole (as defined by
79. Id. at 91 n.2.
80. Id. at 94.
81. Id. at 273.
82. Bruce et al., supra note 61, at 273.
83. Id. at 98 n.1
84. Id. at 99.
85. Id. at 100–101.
86. The study took 1,000 cases of paroled convicts from each of the three main adult male penal
institutions (Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet, Illinois Southern Penitentiary at Menard, and Illinois
State Reformatory at Pontiac).  The cases taken were “all consecutive, beginning with December 31,
1924, and going backward until 1,000 had been examined from each institution.”  Id. at 6.  According to
the Report, “[t]herefore, each man had been released on parole from the institution at least two and
one-half years, and, in certain instances, four, five, and even six years at the time the inquiry was
made.”  Id.
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the limited achievement of not violating parole) to some two dozen independ-
ent variables.  The idea was to see which factors were associated with the likeli-
hood of success on parole.  The twenty-two variables included such things as an
inmate’s father’s race or nationality, social type, mental age, personality type
and psychiatric prognosis, in addition to the circumstances of the crime and
prior criminal records.87  With regard to national origin, Burgess discovered “the
smallest ratio of violations among more recent immigrants like the Italian,
Polish and Lithuanian,” and “the highest rates of violation among the older
immigrants like the Irish, British and German.”88  Burgess did not report any
correlations along race lines, other than to observe that “The group second in
size was the Negro with 152 at Pontiac, 216 at Chester, and 201 at [Joliet].”89
With regard to some of the other interesting independent variables—social type
and psychiatric personality type—I will reproduce the tables in full here.  This is
the table regarding social type produced in the Report:90
87. The full list of twenty-two factors included: “(1) nature of offense; (2) number of associates in
committing offense for which convicted; (3) nationality of the inmate’s father; (4) parental status,
including broken homes; (5) marital status of the inmate; (6) type of criminal, as first offender, occa-
sional offender, habitual offender, professional criminal; (7) social type, as ne’er-do-well, gangster,
hobo; (8) county from which committed; (9) size of community; (10) type of neighborhood; (11) resi-
dent or transient in community when arrested; (12) statement of trial judge and prosecuting attorney
with reference to recommendation for or against leniency; (13) whether or not commitment was upon
acceptance of lesser plea; (14) nature and length of sentence imposed; (15) months of sentence actually
served before parole; (16) previous criminal record of the prisoner; (17) his previous work record; (18)
his punishment record in the institution; (19) his age at time of parole; (20) his mental age according to
psychiatric examination; (21) his personality type according to psychiatric examination; (22) and psy-
chiatric prognosis.”  Bruce et al., supra note 61, at 257–258.
88. Id. at 259.
89. Id. at 259.
90. Id. at 261.  The “ne’er-do-well” category is a term-of-art referring to someone who is a habitual
criminal type (akin to the alcoholic, drug addict, gambler or tramp) who does not actually support him-
self entirely by crime “yet seemed to be continuously delinquent and never willing or able for any
length of time to be law abiding.”  Id. at 241.
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TABLE 1:
SOCIAL TYPE IN RELATION TO PAROLE VIOLATION
VIOLATION RATE BY INSTITUTIONS.
Social Type. Pontiac Menard Joliet
All persons .......................... 22.1% 26.5% 28.4%
Hobos................................... 14.3 46.8 70.5
Ne’er-do-well ...................... 32.8 25.6 63.0
Mean Citizen....................... ____ 30.0 9.5
Drunkard............................. 37.5 38.9 22.7
Gangster .............................. 22.7 23.2 24.1
Recent Immigrant .............. 36.8 16.7 4.0
Farm Boy............................. 11.0 10.2 16.7
Drug Addict ........................ 4.3 66.7 83.3
The table regarding psychiatric personality type:91
TABLE 2:
PSYCHIATRIC PERSONALITY TYPE IN RELATION
TO PAROLE VIOLATIONS.
VIOLATION RATE BY INSTITUTIONS.
Personality Type. Pontiac Menard Joliet
All persons .......................... 22.1% 26.5% 28.4%
Egocentric ........................... 24.3 25.5 38.0
Socially Inadequate ............ 20.0 24.7 22.6
Emotionally Unstable ........ 8.9 * 16.6
* Number of cases insufficient for calculating percentage.
Burgess concluded from his study that identifiable factors could be used to
give much greater predictive abilities to the parole board.  “[T]here can be no
doubt of the feasibility of determining the factors governing the success or the
failure of the man on parole,” Burgess wrote.  “Human behavior seems to be
subject to some degree of predictability.”92  He elaborated:
Many will be frankly skeptical of the feasibility of introducing scientific methods
into any field of human behavior.  They will dismiss the proposal with the assertion
that human nature is too variable for making any prediction about it. . . .  [But] [i]t
would be entirely feasible and should be helpful to the Parole Board to devise a sum-
91. Id. at 269.
92. Id. at 271.
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mary sheet for each man about to be paroled in order for its members to tell at a
glance the violation rate for each significant factor.93
Burgess recommended to the parole board that it create a multi-factor test
to determine likelihood of parole success.  This Burgess did himself, creating a
twenty-one factor test to grade each inmate, and applying the test to his sample
of three thousand cases.  He assigned points for each factor on which the inmate
would have been above the average (high likelihood of success), and then ran
an analysis to determine the percentage of violators.  Those with the highest
number of above average factors (16 to 21) had the lowest violating rates
(1.5%) and those with the lowest number of above average factors (2 to 4) had
the highest offending rates (76%).  This validated his point, Burgess suggested:
The practical value of an expectancy rate should be as useful in parole administra-
tion as similar rates have proved to be in insurance and in other fields where fore-
casting the future is necessary.  Not only will these rates be valuable to the Parole
Board, but they will be equally valuable in organizing the work of supervision.  For if
the probabilities of violation are even, it does not necessarily mean that the prisoner
would be confined to the penitentiary until his maximum was served, but that unusual
precautions would be taken in placing him and in supervising his conduct.  Less of the
attention of the parole officers need in the future be directed toward those who will
succeed without attention and more may be given to those in need of assistance.94
“[P]redictability is feasible,” Burgess wrote.  “The prediction would not be
absolute in any given case, but, according to the law of averages, would apply to
any considerable number of cases.”95  He recommended that the parole decision
be based on a multi-factor analysis using these variables and urged the supervi-
sor of paroles to create an actuarial table of success expectancy.  On the basis of
his research, the full research team declared in its final recommendations to the
chair of the parole board:
[T]he Committee recommends that the Parole Board seriously consider the placing of
its work on a scientific basis by making use of the method of statistical prediction of
the non-violation of parole both in the granting of paroles and in the supervision of
paroled men.  One competent statistician could compile the necessary information
from the records and still further develop the accuracy of prediction by this new
method.96
Burgess’ actuarial system was adopted almost immediately by the Illinois
parole board, and began to be implemented in the period 1932 to 1933.  Clark
Tibbitts conducted additional research and improved slightly on Burgess’s
system.97  At the urging of John Landesco, who had been appointed as a
member of the parole board, the Illinois legislature passed a bill in 1933 pro-
viding for the hiring of sociologists and actuarians “to make analyses and
93. Bruce et al., supra note 61, at 283.
94. Id. at 285.
95. Id. at 284.
96. Id. at 305.
97. See Clark Tibbitts, Success or Failure on Parole Can be Predicted, 22 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 11 (1931).
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predictions in the cases of all men being considered for parole.”98  Ferris F.
Laune, Ph.D., was hired in the official capacity of “Sociologist and Actuary” at
the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet.99  As Laune explained:
It was definitely understood that the work of these men would be something more
than mere routine application of the experience tables already developed by Burgess
and Tibbitts; they were expected to engage in further research for the purpose of
expanding these tables, to refine the factors which had gone into them, and to improve
the methods of prediction in any other way which seemed possible.100
By 1939, the Illinois parole board itself was assisted by three sociologists and
actuaries—as well as five investigators, and approximately sixteen stenogra-
phers, file clerks, and watchmen.101  There was, in addition, a division of parole
supervision with fifty-four employees in Chicago and a slightly smaller office in
Springfield.102  The actuaries would compile the inmate’s information and pre-
pare a report—called a “prognasio”—that predicted the likelihood of success
on parole.  The “prognasio” was “based on the revised Burgess ‘probability’
scale.”103
The Burgess model was relatively primitive, insofar as it merely added up
the variables to produce a score, rather than use a weighted system of multiple
regression analysis.  Nevertheless, it was a precursor that influenced other
models, including the later federal parole decision-making method.104  Most
other states took longer to adopt these types of measures; as of 1961, only one
other state used statistical prediction methods as part of the parole decision.105
But in the 1970s, the actuarial approach became more widely accepted.
What happened, though, is that the actuarial models became narrower and
focused on a smaller set of variables.  Gradually, the key factor for predicting
success or failure on parole became prior criminal history.  The federal govern-
ment, for example, adopted more narrow, more focused parole guidelines.  The
United States Parole Commission relied on the “Salient Factor Score” as an aid
in predicting parole performance.  That method used seven predictive factors;
however, the majority of those seven factors related to prior delinquence.  The
seven factors included prior convictions, prior incarcerations, age at first com-
mitment, offense involvement of auto theft or checks, prior parole revocations,
drug history, and employment history.106  California adopted an actuarial model
98. FERRIS F. LAUNE, PREDICTING CRIMINALITY: FORECASTING BEHAVIOR ON PAROLE 5
(1936).
99. See id., cover page.
100. Id. at 5.
101. Attorney General’s Survey, supra note 64, at 312.
102. See id. at 312–13.
103. Id. at 316.
104. See Peter B. Hoffman & James L. Beck, Parole Decision-Making: A Salient Factor Score, 2 J.
CRIM. JUST. 195, 197 (1974) (describing the federal parole prediction method and explaining that “the
‘Burgess’ method was chosen because of its simplicity and ease of calculation in ‘field’ usage”); see also
SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, supra note 10, at 172 n.3.
105. SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, supra note 10, at 173.
106. See Barbara Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Infer-
ence and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L. J. 1408, 1422 n.38 (1979); see also Hoffman & Beck,
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that also focused more intensely on prior criminality.  The first California
“Base/Expectancy Score” narrowed in on four factors.  One of the four factors
was prior commitments; another was race; and the other two were offense type
and number of escapes.107 For its part, after having a leadership role in develop-
ing actuarial parole guidelines, Illinois ultimately abolished parole release and
adopted determinate sentencing in the late 1970s.
B. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The refinement of actuarial models in the parole context was interrupted in
the 1970s, as many states turned away from indeterminate sentencing toward
fixed sentencing guidelines.  Nevertheless, the period reflects some continuity in
the development of actuarial methods insofar as most of the guidelines that
were developed in the period focused primarily on prior criminal history.
The idea of a commission that would fix sentencing guidelines is one of the
only surviving models of the massive reforms that took place in the 1970s.  In
addition to parole guidelines, other ideas included voluntary sentencing guide-
lines, which were developed in most states by the early 1980s but subsequently
abandoned in most places (except Delaware, Michigan, Utah, Virginia and Wis-
consin), and statutory determinate sentencing schemes, which were developed
in states such as California, Illinois, and Indiana, but were not popular in subse-
quent years.108  As Michael Tonry suggests: “After nearly two decades of
experimentation, the guideline-setting sentencing commission is the only reform
strategy that commands widespread support and continues to be the subject of
new legislation.”109  The turn to fixed sentencing guidelines grew, in part, out of
the development of parole sentencing guidelines in states such as Illinois, Min-
nesota, Oregon, and Washington (which later repealed them in favor of sen-
tencing guidelines).
At the federal level, the sentencing guidelines were the product of a conten-
tious process within an institution—the federal sentencing commission—which
can only be described as an “organization in disarray.”110  The commission had
no particular strategy for developing guidelines and, as a result, different com-
missioners went off in different directions trying to develop their own ideas for
a guideline system.  Commissioner Paul Robinson tried to develop a system
based on “detailed comparative assessments of offenders’ culpability” which
focused first on offense elements (mental and physical components) and then
on a complicated scheme of incremental punishment units relying, in part, on
the squared and cubed root of property values.111  This, the commission found,
supra note 104, at 197–200 (describing nine factors used since November 1, 1973, when it replaced ear-
lier version).
107. See SIMON, supra note 10, at 173.
108. See TONRY, SENTENCING, supra note 7, at 27–28.
109. Id. at 28.
110. See id. at 84.
111. Id. at 86.
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was “unworkable.”112  The commission wrote: “The Commission’s early efforts,
which were directed at devising such a comprehensive guideline system,
encountered serious and seemingly insurmountable problems.  The guidelines
were extremely complex, their application was highly uncertain, and the result-
ing sentences often were illogical.”113  Too much complexity, the commission
noted, would make the guidelines unworkable, and would undermine fairness
since the different variables might interact in unexpected ways.  The commis-
sion explained:
Complexity can seriously compromise the certainty of punishment and its deterrent
effect.  The larger the number of subcategories, the greater the complexity that is cre-
ated and the less workable the system.  Moreover, the factors that create the subcate-
gories will apply in unforeseen situations and interact in unforseen ways, thus creating
unfairness.  Perhaps most importantly, probation officers and courts, in applying a
complex system of subcategories, would have to make a host of decisions about
whether each of the large number of potentially relevant sentencing factors applied.
This added fact-finding would impose a substantial additional burden on judicial
resources.  Furthermore, as the number and complexity of decisions that are required
increases, the risk that different judges will apply the guidelines differently to situa-
tions that in fact are similar also increases.  As a result the very disparity that the
guidelines were designed to eliminate is re-introduced.114
Even if it were administrable, the commission noted, a complex system could
not be properly devised.  “The list of potentially relevant sentencing factors is
long; the fact that they can occur in multiple combinations means that the list of
possible permutations of factors in virtually endless. . . .  The introduction of
crime-control considerations makes the proper interrelationship among sen-
tencing factors even more complex.”115
Commissioners Michael Block and Ilene Nagel tried to devise a different set
of guidelines based on research on deterrence and incapacitation.  “Penalties
would be set that would either have optimal deterrent effects or cost-effectively
incapacitate those at highest risk for future crimes.”116  This, too, proved unsuc-
cessful.  The commission also considered but rejected a simpler, broad-category
approach like those used in some states, which utilize a few simple categories
and narrow imprisonment ranges.  And it considered and rejected “employing
specific factors with flexible adjustment ranges (e.g., one to six levels depending
on the degree of damage or injury).”117
By the time the commission rejected the Robinson proposal and then aban-
doned two subsequent drafts, time was running out.  According to Andrew von
Hirsch, “It was only in the winter of 1986 that other commissioners were drawn
actively into the process.  The final draft was written at a late date in some haste
112. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 13 (June 18, 1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT].
113. Id. at 14.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Id. at 13–14.
116. TONRY, SENTENCING, supra note 7, at 87.
117. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 14.
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to meet the submission deadline.”118  The commission ultimately opted for a
system that focuses primarily on level of offense and prior criminal record, with
few additional variables, to achieve the twin objectives of uniformity and pro-
portionality—uniformity among similar criminal conduct by similar offenders,
and proportionality between different types of offenses.  What the federal
commission adopted, in effect, were a few “key compromises”119 between differ-
ent approaches: a system that permits sentencing ranges, rather than precise
sentences, identified by different levels of seriousness (from level one to level
forty-three) and criminal history, but ranges that are confined to a narrow band
(the maximum of the range cannot exceed the minimum of the range by more
than the greater of six months or 25%).
With regard to empirical analysis, the federal sentencing guidelines were
based loosely on statistical analyses used to estimate current sentencing prac-
tices.  The commission, in effect, began its final approach by trying to ascertain
“typical past practice.”120  As former commissioner Stephen Breyer explains, the
commission “decided to base the Guidelines primarily upon typical, or average,
actual past practice.  The distinctions that the Guidelines make in terms of
punishment are primarily those which past practice has shown were actually
important factors in pre-Guideline sentencing.”121  The commission did not cre-
ate a statistical model to replicate judicial decision making, but instead used a
basic averaging approach to estimate existing sentencing practices along certain
variables.
In terms of empirical data, the commission relied primarily on estimates of
current practices focusing on a small number of relevant variables.  The actual
methodology is somewhat mysterious; the methodological appendix to the sen-
tencing guidelines does not meet social science standards and seems almost de-
liberately intended to obfuscate discussion of the methods used.122  Surprisingly
little has been written about the scientific method, and most of the discussions
rely entirely on the Supplemental Report.  That report, when pieced together,
reveals the following:
The data set consisted of detailed data regarding about 10,500 convictions as
well as less detailed data regarding about 100,000 convictions.  The Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts provided the basic data, which con-
118. Quoted in TONRY, SENTENCING, supra note 7, at 88.
119. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id.
122. In fact, the Supplemental Report has a number of inconsistencies.  At page nine for instance,
we are told that the research staff used “summary reports of 40,000 federal convictions and a sub-
sample of 10,000 augmented presentence reports.”  At page sixteen, the report indicates that the data
contained “detailed data drawn from more than 10,000 presentence investigations, [and] less detailed
data on nearly 100,000 federal convictions during a two-year period.”  At page twenty-one, it refers to
presentence reports from a sample of 10,500 cases.  And at page twenty-two, the report indicates that
the data essentially consisted of “40,000 defendants convicted during 1985.”  The Report never bothers
to clarify the exact size of the detailed and less detailed data sets.
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sisted of all defendant records—felony and misdemeanor—leading to convic-
tions from (apparently) mid-1983 to late 1985 that were in the Federal
Probation Sentencing and Supervision Information System.  The basic informa-
tion included in this data consisted of offense description, defendant’s back-
ground and criminal record, case disposition (trial or appeal), and sentence.  A
sample of 11,000 defendants from approximately 40,000 defendants convicted in
fiscal year 1985 was then taken, and the data for 10,500 of those cases were sup-
plemented with additional information concerning (1) the corresponding pre-
sentence investigation reports and (2) the actual or likely sentence to be served.
The commission then posed several questions of the data:
How much time on average is served currently by convicted federal defendants?  How
does this average vary with characteristics of the offense, the background and criminal
history of the defendant, and the method of disposition?  How much of the variation
about these averages cannot be attributed to the crime and the defendant; that is, how
disparate is sentencing?  What is the rate at which defendants are returning to prison
following a parole revocation?  How long do defendants remain in prison following
revocation?123
The key question—referred to as the “baseline question”—concerned the
sentence of a first time offender who was convicted at trial.  Naturally, there
were few of those in the data set.  So the commission used standard multivariate
statistical analysis124 to draw inferences about the sentences received by first-
time defendants convicted at trial.125  The commission developed two “levels
tables” from the data that assisted them in setting guideline ranges.  The first
table is entitled “Estimated Time Served for Baseline Offenses: 1st Time
Offenders, Sentenced to Prison, Adjusted for Good Time,” and, as its title sug-
gests, gives the estimated length of sentences by offense and the estimated
number of persons sentenced to prison.  The second table, entitled “Estimated
Level Adjustment,” reports the adjustments in estimated length of sentence
associated with different aggravating or mitigating factors.  The factors in the
second table include the level of participation in the offense (leader or lesser
role), whether a weapon was used, whether the crime involved additional plan-
ning, organized crime, hostage taking, infliction of injury, importation of drugs,
blackmail, planned or permanent injury; whether the institution or person vic-
timized was a non-federal facility, the postal service, a government victim, an
especially vulnerable victim or a law enforcement officer; whether the
defendant cooperated, pled guilty, was a drug user, was unusually cruel, or
perjured himself; and whether the defendant generated income primarily from
crime.
The other important dimensions that were studied and incorporated into the
guidelines were prior criminal history and plea bargaining.  The commission
studied the impact of prior criminal history on predicted sentences, as well as
other instruments used to predict recidivism, such as the United States Parole
123. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 22.
124. Multivariate maximum likelihood estimation.
125. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 23.
HARCOURT_FMT_2.DOC 05/29/03  9:43 AM
Summer 2003] ACTUARIAL MODEL IN CRIMINAL LAW 125
Commission’s Salient Factor Score and the Proposed Inslaw Scale for Selecting
Career Criminals for Special Prosecutions.126  Drawing on these measures, the
commission then developed certain ranges of criminal history—called Criminal
History Categories.  With regard to plea agreements, the commission empiri-
cally studied the effect on actual sentences, finding that a guilty plea lowers the
sentence 30 to 40 percent on average.  This average varies with the type of
offense.127  The commission provided for a limited reduction in sentence often
associated with a guilty plea.  This is the “acceptance of responsibility” factor
which is sometimes, but not necessarily, tied to pleading guilty—most often
when there is no charge reduction from a plea agreement.  In addition, the
commission allowed parties to enter into plea agreements that, if accepted by
the sentencing court, would permit sentences in a specific range.128
The commission used the average sentences (conditioned on the percentage
of persons actually sentenced to prison) as the basis for their final delibera-
tions.129  The results of these two tables, the commission explains, “are empiri-
cally-based estimates.”130  They used the empirical evidence to make decisions
about what seemed prevalent and what seemed less acceptable.  As the com-
mission explains:
The Commission did not simply copy estimates of average current sentences as
revealed through analysis of the data.  Rather, it used the results of analyses of current
practice as a guide, departing at different points for various important reasons.  The
guidelines represent an approach that begins with and builds upon empirical data, but
does not slavishly adhere to current sentencing practices.131
The commission then made political choices.  The commission “raised sub-
stantially” the sentences for crimes involving actual (rather than merely threat-
ened) violence, such as murder, aggravated assault, and rape.132  Although the
data revealed considerably lower sentences for robbery of an individual than for
bank robbery, the commission did not find a good rationale for the disparity
and made little distinction in the guidelines.  Though the data revealed lower
sentences for white-collar offenses (embezzlement, fraud, and tax evasion) than
126. Id. at 43.
127. Id. at 48.
128. See id. at 49.
129. See id. at 21 (“The sentencing Commission used Tables 1(a) and 1(b) during its final delibera-
tions.  Earlier results of similar analyses presented in other forms, were used in drafting some of the
guidelines.  Presentence investigation reports were reviewed when the picture from the statistical
analysis was unclear.”  The Commission also used the U.S. Parole Guidelines and averages from the
Parole Commission).  The Commission emphasizes, but rarely develops in detail, the claim that it used
other sources as well.  See id at 23 n.65 (“Many other data sources were also utilized.”).
130. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 22.
131. Id. at 17; see also id. at 22 (“The information derived provided a numerical anchor for guideline
development.  Along with other information at the Commission’s disposal, the analysis of current prac-
tices suggested factors for consideration as guideline ingredients.  It also made it possible to test the
significance of other factors proposed for inclusion in the guidelines.” ); id. at 23 (“The statistical analy-
sis provided the Commission with a meaningful synopsis of current sentencing practices, revealing both
practices that have strong acceptance and those that have weaker support.  This analysis provided valu-
able material for policy deliberations.”).
132. Id. at 19.
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for larceny, the commission decided to ignore the disparities and treat them
essentially identically.  Also, in light of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the commis-
sion imposed guidelines for drug offenses that “are much higher than in current
practice.”133  Moreover, to limit the influence of fact-finding, the commission
limited the number of factual issues on which the guidelines depended.  It
decided to “focus on a relatively manageable number of frequently-occurring
factors and to avoid an effort to attribute specific sentencing weight to every
conceivable nuance.”134  In most of these instances, the commission followed
what it considered to be “expressed legislative intent” or “logical arguments.”135
In terms of departures from the sentencing guidelines, a wide range of indi-
vidual characteristics were determined to be either not relevant or not
ordinarily relevant to the determination whether to depart from the sentencing
range.  These included youth, education and vocational skills, mental and emo-
tional conditions, physique, drug or alcohol dependance, employment record,
family ties and responsibilities and community ties, race, sex, religion, socio-
economic status, military, civic, charitable or public service, and “lack of guid-
ance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbring-
ing.”136
Ultimately, the federal commission used actuarial methods for several pur-
poses—in their words, “to describe specific characteristics of offenses and
offenders who are convicted in federal court; to test the application of the
guidelines to actual cases; to predict the impact of the guidelines on federal
prison population and other components of the federal criminal justice system;
and to monitor the use of the guidelines by the federal courts”137—but the pri-
mary use of statistics in the context of deciding on sentencing ranges was to
estimate present practice in order to allow for political choice.
133. Id. at 18.
134. Id. at 46 (noting in fn. 78 that “the sentencing factors also tend to be those that are closely tied
to elements of the offense (e.g., nature of injury, amount of loss), thus ensuring that evidence relating to
them will be adduced in the event of a trial”).
135. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 18, 19.  For those not familiar with the federal sen-
tencing guidelines, what the commission developed, in brutal simplicity, is a system that works as fol-
lows:
1. First, you determine a base level for the applicable offense, making sure to include any
offense-specific characteristics (such as adjustments for the amount of money involved,
the age of the victim, the amount of harm, whether a dangerous weapon was used,
whether it was government property, etc.);
2. then you adjust the level based on factors involving the victim (hate crime, official victim,
restraint of victim, or terrorism); the role of the defendant (organizer and leader or
minimal participant); whether there was any obstruction of justice; and whether the
defendant has accepted responsibility for the crime;
3. you determine the defendant’s criminal history category, and find the proper guideline
range corresponding to the offense level and criminal history category;
4. then you determine whether to depart from the guideline range, and whether other
options related to probation, supervision, fines or restitution apply.
136. Guideline Manual, Chapter 5, Part H, Sec. 5H1.1–5H1.12; see generally TONRY, SENTENCING,
supra note 7, at 22; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is
Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV.  833 (1992).
137. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 9.
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One important caveat is in order.  There is good evidence that some federal
prosecutors and defendants have been deliberately evading the guidelines
through plea negotiations.  Federal criminal litigation is characterized by mas-
sive plea bargaining—both fact bargaining, which is expressly condemned by
the federal sentencing guidelines,138 and charge bargaining, which is far more
common—that significantly erodes any possibility of a “scientific” process.  As
Ilene Nagel and Stephen Schulhofer have shown, judges and prosecutors do cir-
cumvent the federal guidelines through plea bargaining.  Nagel and Schulhofer
conducted an empirical study of three federal districts and found rates of possi-
ble guideline circumvention through charge, fact, or factor bargaining of about
11%, 25% (or more), and 6% to 8% respectively.139  Given that plea negotia-
tions resolve such a large percentage of federal cases (88% in 1990140), there is a
lot of room for manipulation.  What this suggests, of course, is that any reliance
on empirically-based estimates of past practice is even further eroded—above
and beyond the significant political choices made.
While this second case study has centered on the federal guidelines, it is
important to note that most of the state guidelines and sentencing mechanisms
also use two-dimensional grids that focus primarily on the same two factors—
severity of the crime and prior criminal history.  As Michael Tonry explains:
Reduced to their core elements, all sentencing guidelines grids are fundamentally
the same: two-dimensional tables that classify crimes by their severity along one axis
and criminal records by their extent along the other.  Applicable sentences for any
case are calculated by finding the cell where the applicable criminal record column
intersects with the applicable offense severity row.  Guidelines grids vary in details.
Although most divide crimes into ten or twelve categories, some use more. . . .  They
vary in ornateness.  Although most, like Washington’s, provide a range of presumptive
sentences such as “twenty-one to twenty-seven months” for any offense sever-
ity/criminal record combination, those in North Carolina (1994) and Pennsylvania
(1994) contain a range for “ordinary cases” and separate ranges for cases in which
aggravating or mitigating considerations are present.  Finally, they vary in severity.141
Moreover, like the federal commission, most of the state commissions have also
designed and adopted normative guidelines intended to change current sen-
tencing practice, rather than descriptive guidelines intended to replicate existing
practice with greater consistency.142
138. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 6B1.4(a)(2).
139. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501,
526, 534, 542 (1992).  See also Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene Nagel, Negotiated Pleas under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231 (1989) (reporting how, in
fifteen months following implementation of federal guidelines,  guidelines circumvented in an
identifiable minority of cases resolved by guilty plea; however, preliminary analysis involves small
number of cases and informal research methods).
140. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 553.
141. TONRY, SENTENCING, supra note 7, at 15.
142. Id. at 49.
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C. Criminal Profiling
Criminal profiling emerged as a formal law enforcement tool in the mid-
twentieth century in the United States.  One of the first well-known uses of
criminal profiling was the hijacker profiles developed in the 1960s to disrupt the
hijacking of American planes.  The Federal Aviation Administration put in
place a hijacker profile beginning in October 1968.  The profile was based on a
detailed study of the known characteristics of identified airline highjackers, and
it highlighted approximately twenty-five characteristics, primarily behavioral.143
Criminal profiling became more frequent in the 1970s with drug-courier profiles
and alien smuggling profiles.144  The list of profiles that have been developed is
long, and includes many crime-specific profiles like the “drug smuggling vessel
profile, the stolen car profile, the stolen truck profile, the alimentary-canal
smuggler profile, the battering parent profile, and the poacher profile.”145
There are several different types of criminal profiling mechanisms, and they
can be arrayed along several dimensions.146  One dimension has to do with the
type of data upon which the profiles are based.  Some profiles are derived from
external, observable characteristics that are identifiable in law enforcement
reports and arrest records: clothing, hair-style, facial hair, demeanor, nervous-
ness, luggage, etc.  The drug-courier profile is an example of this type.  Other
profiles are based primarily on psychological data: mental health and counseling
reports, analyses of family and social relationships, interviews of friends and
family.  The school shooter threat assessment model and serial killer profiles fit
in this category.  Another dimension has to do with the timing of the profile—
whether the profile is assembled ex ante from previous arrests in order to
identify future suspects for investigation, or whether the crime has been
committed and a profile is being assembled from the known facts to identify a
suspect.  Drug-courier profiling fits in the first category.  An ongoing homicide
investigation might fit in the second, particularly where a serial killer profile is
being developed from the evidence.  It is possible to categorize these different
types of profiling in a two-way matrix:
143. The “hijacker profile,” which would trigger an examination with a magnetometer, was discon-
tinued in 1973 when the FAA required all passengers to go through metal detectors.  In 1980, however,
the FAA started using the profile again in order to target suspects bringing gasoline on board planes.
See generally HARRIS, supra note 39, at 10–11, 17–26; J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE
IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 404–437 (5th  ed. 2002); Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile:
‘All Seems Infected That Th’ Infected Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic’d Eye, 65 N.C. L. REV.
417, 423 n.45; John T. Dailey, Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates, 18 VILL. L. REV.
1004, 1008 (1973); Heumann & Cassak, supra note 38; McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Sei-
zures—A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 302–03 (1972).
144. See generally, HARRIS, supra note 39, at 10–11, 17–26.
145. Becton, supra note 143, at 424–425.
146. Some commentators use the term “criminal profiling” to refer exclusively to criminal suspect
profiling—the type of reactive, after-the-crime type of profiling intended to create a profile of a sus-
pect.  See Heumann & Cassak, supra note 38, at 915–19.  I am referring to criminal profiling here as the
umbrella category.
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TABLE 3:
PROFILING MATRIX
Mental Physical
Ex ante School shooter drug-courier
Ex post Homicide investigation Witness ID
1. The Drug-Courier Profile
The drug-courier profile is one of the more prominent examples of a crimi-
nal profile.  The profile was developed through DEA agents’ experience, and it
reflects, in this sense, a product of a combination of clinical and statistical find-
ings, but not statistical in a fancy sense.  It consists of personal observations
from a large number of cases involving subjective judgment built over many
years.  “In theory, the drug courier profile seeks to incorporate the subjective
judgments of experienced narcotics agents into a statistical model that uses pre-
determined profile characteristics based on an analysis of prior cases.”147  In
practice, it is far less statistical, and far more judgmental.
The drug-courier program was first implemented at the Detroit airport in
the fall of 1974.  Between 1976 and 1986 there were in excess of 140 reported
decisions involving DEA stops of passengers at airports based on the drug-cou-
rier profile.148  The profiles used in the first experiment in Detroit were based on
“empirical data gathered during eighteen months surveillance at Detroit Met-
ropolitan Airport,”149 and they focused on the conduct and appearance of trav-
elers.  “Before developing the drug courier profile, DEA agents learned the
modus operandi of cross-country drug distributors and couriers through conver-
sations with undercover operators, informants, and cooperative defendants—
those arrested on drug charges as well as convicted codefendants who turned
state’s evidence.”150  Most of the evidence about these profiles comes from litiga-
tion on motions to suppress or for selective enforcement.  The information,
though, was not made public but was reviewed in camera so as not to disclose
the behavioral model that the DEA agents had developed.151
Most students of the drug-courier profile trace it back to two former DEA
agents, John Marcello and Paul Markonni, who are considered the “Godfa-
147. Becton, supra note 143, at 429–430.
148. See id. at 417 n.2, 417–418.
149. Id. at 430 n.72.
150. Id. at 426.
151. See id. at 430 n.72.
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thers” of the profile.152  They and other DEA agents started identifying the
common characteristics of illegal drug couriers in airports.  Much of this started
on tips from informants or airline personnel.
As DEA Agent Markonni explained in United States v. McClain, “[t]he majority of
our cases, when we first started, involved cases we made based on information from
law enforcement agencies or from airline personnel.  And as these cases were made,
certain characteristics were noted among the defendants.153
The airplane-highjacker profile was also an important source of information,
because stops based on that profile often netted persons in possession of
drugs.154
“At some point in time the DEA apparently undertook a nationwide effort
to draw a composite picture of those persons likely to carry illegal drugs.”155
This effort was not successful.  As the United States government declared in its
petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme Court in the Mendenhall case,
“there is no national [drug-courier] profile; each airport unit has developed its
own set of drug courier characteristics on the basis of that unit’s experience. . . .
Furthermore, the profile is not rigid, but is constantly modified in light of expe-
rience.”156
The drug-courier profile has become familiar today.  In the Mendenhall
case, for example, the female defendant was stopped in part on the basis of the
following:
The agent testified that the respondent’s behavior fit the so-called “drug courier pro-
file”—an informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical of persons
carrying illicit drugs. In this case the agents thought it relevant that (1) the respondent
was arriving on a flight from Los Angeles, a city believed by the agents to be the place
of origin for much of the heroin brought to Detroit; (2) the respondent was the last
person to leave the plane, “appeared to be very nervous,” and “completely scanned
the whole area where [the agents] were standing”; (3) after leaving the plane the
respondent proceeded past the baggage area without claiming any luggage; and (4) the
respondent changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit.157
Several scholars, David Cole in particular, have compiled lists of the drug-cou-
rier profile characteristics, which are often internally contradictory.158  With
time, the profiles have proliferated.  As Charles Becton explains:
Not only does each airport have a profile, but a single DEA agent may use multiple
profiles of his or her own.  Paul Markonni, the person most often credited with devel-
oping the drug courier profile, and clearly the agent most often listed in drug courier
profile cases, has articulated several slightly varying profiles in reported cases.  One
court has used different profiles for incoming  and outgoing flights.  The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Patino  made reference to a
“female” drug courier profile. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
152. HARRIS, supra note 39, at 20; Becton, supra note 143, at 426, 433–434.
153. Becton, supra note 143, at 426.
154. See id. at 426–427.
155. Id. at 427.
156. Pet. Cert. at 17–18 n.17 (quoted in Becton, supra note 143, at 433).
157. U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n.1.(1980)
158. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE : RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 48–49 (1999); Becton, supra note 143, at 421.
HARCOURT_FMT_2.DOC 05/29/03  9:43 AM
Summer 2003] ACTUARIAL MODEL IN CRIMINAL LAW 131
cuit referred to a regional profile in United States v. Berry, and a profile associated
with particular agents in United States v. Elmore.  And, contributing to the prolifera-
tion of the drug courier profile, state and local law enforcement agencies have insti-
tuted their own profile programs.159
How much credence should we give these drug-courier profiles?  On this
question opinions differ widely.  According to Justice Powell, concurring in
Mendenhall, the drug-courier profile is a “highly specialized law enforcement
operation.”160  In the per curiam opinion in Reid, the Court referred to the drug-
courier profile as “a somewhat informal compilation of characteristics believed
to be typical of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics.”161  Chief Justice
Rehnquist has referred to the profile as “the collective or distilled experience of
narcotics officers concerning characteristics repeatedly seen in drug smug-
glers.”162  According to David Cole, the drug-courier profile “simply compiles
the collective wisdom and judgment of a given agency’s officials.  Instead of
requiring each officer to rely on his or her own limited experience in detecting
suspicious behavior, the drug-courier profile gives every officer the advantage
of the agency’s collective experience.”163
In 1982, the National Institute of Justice—the research arm of the Depart-
ment of Justice—conducted a systematic study of the drug-courier profile.164
The study required DEA agents to fill out a report for all encounters they insti-
gated and a log of passengers observed during an eight-week period in 1982.  Of
about 107,000 passengers observed, the participating agents approached 146.
According to the report, most of the encounters (120 of the total 146) were trig-
gered by a combination of behavioral and demographic peculiarities of the pas-
sengers—what we can call matches to a profile.  The results were as follows:165
TABLE 4:
PASSENGER OBSERVATIONS
Number Percentage
Total passengers 146 100%
No search after questioning 42 29%
Consent searches 81 55%
Searches with warrant or incident
to arrest
15 10%
159. Becton, supra note 143, at 433–434.
160. U.S. v. Mendenhall, supra note 157, at 562 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and
Blackmun, J.).
161. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (per curiam).
162. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507 (1983).
163. COLE, supra note 158, at 47.
164. See EDWIN ZEDLEWSKI, THE DEA AIRPORT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF
AGENT ACTIVITIES (1984) (reported in MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 143, at 425–26).
165. Id.
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Contraband found or other
evidence of crime
49 34%
2. The School Shooter Threat Assessment
The architects of the school shooter threat assessment model emphatically
stress that it is not a criminal profile.  On the first page of the FBI Report titled
The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective, the FBI states: “This
model is not a ‘profile’ of the school shooter or a checklist of danger signs
pointing to the next adolescent who will bring lethal violence to a school.  Those
things do not exist . . . .”166  “[T]rying to draw up a catalogue of ‘checklist’ or
warning signs to detect a potential school shooter can be shortsighted, even
dangerous,” the FBI emphasizes.  “Such lists, publicized by the media, can end
up unfairly labeling many nonviolent students as potentially dangerous or even
lethal.”167  Janet Reno echoes the caution label: the model must be used “judi-
ciously,” given that “the risk of unfairly labeling and stigmatizing children is
great.”168  Nevertheless, the school shooter threat assessment model is a method
to determine the seriousness of school threats that depends in large part on a
four-prong analysis of the personality traits and relationships of the threatening
youth—in other words, on a profile of the more likely school shooter.  As Janet
Reno explains, the Report contains “a chapter on key indicators that should be
regarded as warning signs in evaluating threats.”169  These key indicators amount,
effectively, to a profile.
The school shooter model is based on an empirical case-study approach.
The National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (“NCAVC”) developed
the model as a way to study school shooters “from a behavioral perspective.”170
The NCAVC worked with law enforcement officers, school teachers and
administrators, mental health professionals, and “experts in disciplines includ-
ing adolescent violence, mental health, suicidology, school dynamics, and family
dynamics.”171  The model was based primarily on an analysis of eighteen school-
shooting cases from across the United States—including fourteen cases in which
shootings occurred and four cases of planned and prepared, but prevented
shootings.  In addition, the analysts considered an undisclosed number of cases
in which a threat assessment was being prepared.  The data consisted of infor-
mation provided by the school and law enforcement officials, including sum-
mary investigative reports, interviews of the offenders, witness statements,
166. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A
THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE, at 1, available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/
school/school2.pdf [hereinafter SCHOOL SHOOTER] ( last visited  May 5, 2003).
167. Id. at 2; see also id. at 15.
168. Id. at iii.
169. Id. at iii (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 2.
171. Id. at 2.
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interviews with people who knew the offenders and families, crime scene
photographs and videos, counseling and psychiatric reports, examples of the
offenders’ writings, drawings, essays, letters, poems, songs, videos and tapes,
school records and school work of the offenders, trial psychiatric reports, and
“other pertinent case materials.”172
How then does the model work?  The model focuses first on the type of
threat presented—whether it is a direct specific threat with highly plausible de-
tails identifying the potential victims and locations, or, at the other extreme, a
vague and indirect threat with inconsistent or implausible details and content
that suggests that the student is unlikely to carry it out.  Next, the model pro-
poses a four-prong assessment of the student making the threat, focusing on the
personality of the student, and the family, school and social dynamics sur-
rounding the youth.  The model lists “warning signs” in these four categories—
traits or circumstances that might lead an assessor to believe that the threat is
credible.
In terms of prong one—personality traits and behavior—the list includes
such things as “leakages,” which reveal clues to violent or macabre feelings or
fantasies, “low tolerance for frustration,” “poor coping skills,” “lack of resil-
ience,” “failed love relationship,” “nurs[ing] resentment over real or perceived
injustices,” “signs of depression,” “narcissism,” “alienation,” “lack of empathy,”
“attitude of superiority,” “exaggerated or pathological need for attention,”
“intolerance,” “inappropriate humor,” “lack of trust,” “change of behavior,” or
being “rigid and opinionated.”173  In terms of prong two—family dynamics—the
list includes “turbulent parent-child relationship,” parental “acceptance of
pathological behavior,” “lack of intimacy” within the family, “few or no limits
on the child’s conduct,” or “no limits or monitoring of TV or Internet.”174  The
third prong—school dynamics—includes the student’s being detached from
school, bullying and inequitable discipline as part of the school culture, or a
prevalent “code of silence” among the students.175  Finally, the fourth prong—
social dynamics—includes a violent or extremist peer group, drug and alcohol
use, or a “copycat behavior” that may mimic school violence elsewhere.176
In terms of interventions, the Report strongly suggests that schools form
multidisciplinary threat assessment and management teams which include law
enforcement.  “It is strongly recommended that a law enforcement representative
should either be included as a member of the team or regularly consulted as a
resource person,” the Report emphasizes.177  In the case of a high-level threat—
determined in part on the basis of the four prong investigation—the Report rec-
ommends that the school should immediately inform the appropriate law
172. SCHOOL SHOOTER, supra note 166, at 35; see generally id. at 34–35.
173. Id. at 16–20.
174. Id. at 21–22.
175. Id. at 22–23.
176. Id. at 24.
177. Id. at 26 (emphasis in original).
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enforcement agency “almost always;” for medium level threats, “in most cases;”
and for low level threats, sometimes.178
In sum, here is how the model works:
Here is how the Four-Pronged Assessment Model can be used when a threat is
received at a school: A preliminary assessment is done on the threat itself, as outlined
in the preceding chapter [i.e. whether direct and specific or vague threat].  If the
threatener’s identity is known, a threat assessor quickly collects as much information
as is available in the four categories [personality, family, school and social dynamics].
The assessor may be a school psychologist, counselor, or other staff member or spe-
cialist who has been designated and trained for this task.  Information can come from
the assessor’s personal knowledge of the student or can be sought from teachers, staff,
other students (when appropriate), parents, and other appropriate sources such as law
enforcement agencies or mental health specialists.
If the student appears to have serious problems in the majority of the four prongs
or areas and if the threat is assessed as high or medium level, the threat should be
taken more seriously and appropriate intervention by school authorities and/or law
enforcement should be initiated as quickly as possible.179
When the threat assessment model was unveiled, some commentators
expressed concern about potential misuse of the data.180  Despite the caution
labels, newspaper accounts suggest that there have been some inappropriate
uses of the method.181  The model nevertheless continues to be influential as a
way to assess school threats and has generated more research on psychological
profiling.
These case studies suggest that the actuarial models deployed in criminal
law evolved over the course of the twentieth century and, particularly in the
parole and sentencing area, focused increasingly on the prior criminal history of
the accused.  The development of parole is a story of actuarial aspirations, clini-
cal realities by default, displaced by a multi-factored test, and leading to a nar-
rower and narrower actuarial model.  In the context of indeterminate sentenc-
ing, the model gradually shifted from trying to find the most appropriate
rehabilitative remedy, which is extremely hard to operationalize, to using prob-
abilities to predict success or failure on parole, which is more easily operation-
178. SCHOOL SHOOTER, supra note 166, at 27.
179. Id. at 10–11.
180. For expressions of concern about the possible negative unintended consequences of the model,
see Scott S. Greenberger, FBI Lists Traits of Violent Students Report Examines Youth Shootings,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7, 2000, at B4 (Vincent Schiraldi of the Justice Policy Institute, a Washington
research group that focuses on juvenile justice issues, noted that there is potential for overreaction: “If
this gets used inappropriately, it’s not a stretch to imagine school principals coming up with lists of the
10 most dangerous kids”); Eric Lichtblau, FBI Urges Educators to Spot Signs of Violence; Crime:
Experts are Skeptical the Report Adds much to the Ongoing Debate over How to Stop School Shootings,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2000, at A18 (one psychology scholar, Laurence Steinberg of Temple University,
argued that the Report may be “an open invitation to stigmatize children who may simply be express-
ing opinions they are entitled to have”).
181. According to newspaper reports, an 11th grade honors student was suspended based on a
stream-of-consciousness journal that possessed “angst, guilt, bravado, and self-pity,” and another
honors student was expelled for “threatening artwork” in the form of a poem in which a “madman”
reacts to the murder of his dog. See Robyn Blumner, Whose Constitutional Rights at Risk of Being
Trampled? MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 19, 2000, at 19A (also appears in the Editorial
Section of the Chicago Sun–Times, Dec. 18, 2000 and the St. Petersburg Times, Dec. 17, 2000).
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alized, to narrowing in on one key factor, prior criminal history, which is the
easiest model to operationalize.  This evolution is reflected in the progress from
the writings of Professors Paul Freund and Roscoe Pound, to the research and
model of Professor Ernest Burgess, to the Salient Factor Score.  The formaliza-
tion and narrowing of parole guidelines had an important influence on the
development of sentencing guidelines, which continued to narrow the focus of
the actuarial model to the severity of crime and prior criminal history.  The
development of criminal profiling in the mid-twentieth century reflects another
effort to use a quasi-actuarial approach based on mixed statistical and clinical
methods to predict criminal behavior.  It reflects another tool which—like the
later parole and sentencing guidelines—is aimed narrowly at observable con-
duct and visible attributes associated with crime.
Overall, the actuarial models were and remain primitive in the criminal law.
They reflect basic probability assessments and straightforward statistical mod-
els.  They are not highly sophisticated and, most often, are overshadowed by
political choices.  In the end, the net effect of the evolution of the actuarial in
criminal law has been to train criminal law increasingly on the narrow question
of prior criminal history.  The desire to know the criminal and to predict his
criminality has had serious consequences for the way we think about and
engage in law enforcement, sentencing and punishment.
IV
REFLECTING ON THE ACTUARIAL MODEL
The account I offer raises a number of questions.  In this Part I would like to
focus on one in particular: Is it possible that the refinement of the actuarial
model in criminal law, in a world of scarce law enforcement resources, has con-
tributed to the increasing racial imbalance in our carceral populations?  The
answer, I will suggest, is very possibly yes, under certain conditions that seem to
characterize the existing field of criminal law, crime and punishment.  These
conditions include, first, limited law enforcement resources; second, an abun-
dant supply of criminal activity; and third, relatively unreliable measures of
natural offending rates, resulting in relatively heavy reliance on police data
(arrests, informants, intelligence) to gauge the extent of street crime.  Under
these conditions, focusing on any one predictive factor is likely to compound
the apparent effect of that factor on crime.  In other words, if we identify a cor-
relation between a group trait (gender, race, religion, background, criminal
history, genes, etc.) and criminal activity, and then target our law enforcement
interventions on the basis of that trait, the paradoxical effect may be that the
correlation itself gets reinforced over time.  This is true whether the profiling is
perceived as legitimate or not—whether it is a response to differential offending
rates or whether it reflects purely malicious selective enforcement.  It may be
true whether we are merely allocating limited law enforcement resources in
direct proportion to the amount of crime associated with that group trait or
engaging in deliberate discrimination.
HARCOURT_FMT_2.DOC 05/29/03  9:43 AM
136 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:99
This can be demonstrated with a simple computation, relying on a few basic
assumptions about criminal profiling.  For purposes here, I will use racial pro-
filing as an illustration.  I will define racial profiling as the explicit or implicit
use of race in law enforcement decisions such as the decision to stop and inves-
tigate a suspect, or the decision to police a specific neighborhood.  Race is used
explicitly when it is expressly referred to as one among other criteria, such as
when a police officer stops someone in part because she believes that members
of that person’s race are more likely to commit the crime under investigation.182
With the exception of anti-terrorism policing, this has become increasingly hard
to establish.  For that reason, I also include an implicit definition of racial pro-
filing.  Race is used implicitly when law enforcement is being targeted toward a
racial group in greater proportion than that group’s representation in the
population—such as, for instance, when police officers stop-and-frisk young
black men in proportion to their purported contribution to crime rather than
their representation in the general population.  This reflects a disparate impact
prong of racial profiling.  It is more controversial insofar as many commentators
would not necessarily consider it racial profiling.  The point of my analysis,
though, is precisely to demonstrate that even this second, possibly less contro-
versial type of racial profiling, may be a self-confirming prophecy.
When an accusation of racial profiling is made, the justification for dispro-
portionate enforcement often rests on two premises.  The first is that members
of certain racial groups offend at a disproportionately higher rate than their
representation in the general population.  This premise is reflected, for instance,
in the argument that the racial disproportionality in admissions to state prisons
does not reflect racial discrimination so much as differential involvement in
crime (as measured principally by arrests).  In articles in 1982 and 1993, Alfred
Blumstein studied the racial disproportionality of the United States prison
population and essentially concluded that “the bulk of the disproportionality is
a consequence of the differential involvement by blacks in the most serious
kinds of crime like homicide and robbery.”183
182. For a definition of racial profiling along these lines, see Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston,
Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002).  This definition, as should be
clear, includes the narrower case in which an individual is stopped solely because of his or her race.  In
line with social reality, it adopts the broader definition.
183. Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO.
L. REV. 743, 759 (1993)(finding that overall approximately 76% of racial disproportionality in prisons
in 1991 was attributable to differential arrest rates; also finding that the contribution of differential
offending rates decreases with less serious crimes); see also Alfred Blumstein, Criminology; On the
Racial Disproportionality of United States’ Prison Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1259
(1982) (finding that approximately 80% of the racial disproportions in prison in 1979 were attributable
to differential arrest rates); Patrick A. Langan, Racism on Trial: New Evidence to Explain the Racial
Composition of Prisons in the United States, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 666, 682–683 (1985) (con-
ducted a similar study in 1985 and concluded that “even if racism exists, it might explain only a small
part of the gap between the 11% black representation in the United States adult population and the
now nearly 50% black representation among persons entering state prisons each year in the United
States”).  For arguments challenging this proposition, especially the reliance on arrest statistics as evi-
dence of offending, see HARRIS, supra note 39, at 76–78 (arguing that arrests measure police activity,
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Blumstein’s studies generated a tremendous amount of debate over the
causes of racial disproportionality in prisons.  Michael Tonry, in his book
Malign Neglect, extensively reviews the literature and concludes, with one
important caveat, that “[f]rom every available data source, discounting to take
account of their measurement and methodological limits, the evidence seems
clear that the main reason that black incarceration rates are substantially higher
than those for whites is that black crime rates for imprisonable crimes are sub-
stantially higher than those for whites.”184  (The caveat is that, since 1980, the
War on Drugs and other tough-on-crime measures deliberately contributed to
the steady worsening of racial disparities in the justice system.)  For present
purposes, we need only observe that the justification for racial profiling often
rests on the assumption of differential offending rates among different racial
groups.185
The second premise is that if we discover disproportionate offending rates
among a distinct group, it is only fair to target law enforcement resources in
relation to their disproportionate contribution to crime rather than to their rep-
resentation in the general population.  In other words, if African Americans
represent 25% of the general population, but 45% of the offending population,
it is fair to expend about 45% of our law enforcement resources on African-
American suspects or in African-American neighborhoods.  This second prem-
ise is captured, for instance, in the argument that law enforcement officials
engage in racial profiling “for reasons of simple efficiency.  A policeman who
concentrates a disproportionate amount of his limited time and resources on
young black men is going to uncover far more crimes—and therefore be far
more successful in his career—than one who biases his attention toward, say,
middle-aged Asian women.”186  To do otherwise, some argue, would make no
sense:
A racial-profiling ban, under which police officers were required to stop and question
suspects in precise proportion to their demographic representation (in what? the pre-
cinct population? the state population?  the national population?) would lead to mas-
sive inefficiencies in police work.  Which is to say, massive declines in the apprehen-
sion of criminals.187
not offending); but see TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT, supra note 8, at 70–74 (arguing that arrests broadly
reflect offending).
184. TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT, supra note 8, at 79; see also id. at viii, 3, 50.
185. Those who oppose racial profiling, in fact, sometime accept this first premise.  Randall Ken-
nedy, for instance, writes “there’s no use pretending that blacks and whites commit crimes (or are
victims of crime) in exact proportion to their respective shares of the population.  Statistics abundantly
confirm that African Americans—and particularly young black men—commit a dramatically dispropor-
tionate share of street crime in the United States.  This is a sociological fact, not a figment of the
media’s (or the police’s) racist imagination.” Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy: Racial Profiling Usually
Isn’t Racist; It Can Help Stop Crime; And It Should Be Abolished.  NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1999, at
30.
186. John Derbyshire, In Defense of Racial Profiling, NAT’L REV., February 19, 2001, at 38, avail-
able at http://www.nationalreview.com/19feb01/derbyshire021901.shtml.
187. Id.
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Police officers who defend racial profiling often do so based on the dispropor-
tionate offending rates for certain crimes by certain members of minority
groups.188  So, in New York City for instance, former police commissioner
Howard Safir justified the disproportionate stops of African Americans and
Hispanics by pointing to the disproportionate racial breakdown of eye-witness
identifications, arguing that allocating resources along those lines is not dis-
criminatory.  “The ethnic breakdown of those stopped-and-frisked in the city as
a whole,” Safir emphasized, “corresponds closely with the ethnic breakdown of
those committing crimes in the city.”189  In the litigation concerning the New
Jersey State Police and their practices of disproportionately stopping black
drivers on the New Jersey Turnpike between 1988 and 1991, the State of New
Jersey’s expert statistician attempted to prove that black drivers drive faster
than whites, in an effort to justify the disproportionate number of law enforce-
ment stops of black drivers.190  In fact, even some opponents of racial profiling
accept this second premise: “Racial selectivity of this sort,” Randall Kennedy
writes, “can be defended on nonracist grounds and is, in fact, embraced by
people who are by no means anti-black bigots and are not even cops.”191
A simple computation will show, however, that these two premises—if
implemented in a world of scarce law enforcement resources and plentiful
criminal activity—may be self-confirming and may lead to increasingly racially
disproportional carceral populations.192  Imagine a major metropolitan area like
New York City with approximately eight million inhabitants, where 25% of the
population is African American (I will refer to this group as “minority” or
“minorities” and to the other 75% as “majority” or “majorities”).193  Assume
188. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Mainte-
nance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 807 (1999).
189. See NYPD RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS—POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN NEW YORK CITY 13, available at http://
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/dclm/exsumm.html (emphasis in original).
190. See State of New Jersey v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 354–55 (N.J. Super. 1996) (granting motions to
suppress evidence on the ground of selective enforcement in violation of the equal protection clause).
191. Kennedy, supra note 185.
192. In all the following calculations, numbers are rounded and percentages are displayed to the
second or third decimal point.  The calculations themselves, however, have been performed by means
of a computerized model and are based on exact percentages.  This accounts for minor apparent dis-
crepancies in the following tables.  The central premise of this thought experiment—namely scarce law
enforcement resources, plentiful criminal activity, and unreliable measures of natural offending rates—
reflects an assumption of extremely low elasticity of crime to policing, which is what differentiates this
thought experiment from existing economic models of racial profiling.  See, e.g., John Knowles et al.,
Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 212, 227–28 (2001)
(assuming elasticity of crime to policing and finding that disparities in the probability of being searched
are due to statistical discrimination and not racial prejudice); Vani K. Boorah, Racial Bias in Police
Stops and Searches: An Economic Analysis, 17 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 17, 35–36 (2001) (same).  By
assuming low elasticity and different offending rates, this thought experiment highlights the
consequences of policing in proportion to offending rather than demographic distributions.
193. The 2000 Census reports that New York City had a population of 8,008,278, of which 2,129,762
persons (or 26.6 percent)  were listed in the category “Black or African American alone.”  See U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000: CENSUS 2000 BRIEF
(August 2001) at 7.  The analysis in this essay applies equally to any other minority group, such as His-
panics, Asian Americans, lower income, upper income, or prior convicts.  I use African Americans as
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that all crime is committed by males between the ages of 15 and 40, and that this
group consists of approximately two million persons, of which 75% are majori-
ties and 25% are minorities.  Assume that the incarcerated population from this
large city (persons incarcerated in prison or jail) consists of approximately
55,000 persons (a rate of 688 per 100,000, which is consistent with the national
average), and that they are all males between 15 and 40.194  Assume that 45% of
those incarcerated persons are minorities, and the other 55% are majorities.195
Assume that the incarceration rates reflect offending rates much more than
intentional discrimination—in other words, that minorities represent about 45%
of offenders, majorities about 55%.  What these assumptions mean is that
minorities are offending at a higher rate as a percent of their population than
are majorities: the proportion of minority males 15 to 40 convicted of a crime
and sentenced to a term of incarceration is higher than the proportion for
majority males 15 to 40.  The “criminal element” in the minority group is bigger
than the “criminal element” in the majority group.  At time zero, here is the
situation:
TABLE 5:
TIME ZERO
Category Total Majority Minority
City Population 8,000,000 6,000,000 (75%) 2,000,000 (25%)
Male 15 to 40 Population 2,000,000 1,500,000 (75%) 500,000 (25%)
Incarcerated Population 55,000 (100%) 30,250 (55%) 24,750 (45%)
Percent Incarcerated by Group 2.75% 2.02% 4.95%
Now, let us assume that we decide to engage in street stops on the basis of a
criminal profile based on race differentials.  We decide to stop-and-frisk 150,000
young men 15 to 40,196 and we allocate 45% of our resources to minority sus-
pects.  Assuming that we find evidence of criminal activity in proportion to the
“criminal element” in each group—in other words, assuming that the popula-
the minority group in this illustration because criminal justice statistics are more easily broken down by
race.
194. At year end 2001, the incarceration rate in the United States  (number of persons held in state
or federal prisons or in local jails per 100,000 U.S. residents) was 686.  See PRISONERS IN 2001, supra
note 3, at 2, Table 1.
195. At year end 2001, African-American, non-Hispanic persons represented about 46% of all
incarcerated inmates under state and federal jurisdiction with sentences of more than one year.  See id.
at 11–12.
196. In New York City, with a police force of about 40,000 officers, the police department report-
edly conducted approximately 127,000 (72.5% of 175,000 UF–250 Forms) stops involving a search,
forcible stop or arrest during the period January 1998 to March 1999.  See ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S ‘STOP & FRISK’ PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 88–91 (1999), available at
http://www. oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_frisk/stop_frisk.html.
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tions of young men are offending at rates consistent with their relative incarcer-
ated populations—we will arrest and send to jail (and perhaps later to prison)
the following number of young men:
TABLE 6:
YEAR ONE
Category Total Majority Minority
Stopped Population 150,000 82,500 (55%) 67,500 (45%)
New Admission Population 5,005 2.02% of 82,500 or 1664 4.95% of 67,500 or 3,341
New Admission Percentage 100% 33.24% 66.76%
At the end of the first year, we would have apprehended 5,005 young men
through this policy of racial profiling of stop-and-frisks.  We would be picking
up primarily offenses such as possession of drugs, guns, or other contraband,
drug dealing, probation violations, outstanding warrants, etc.  Naturally, we can
imagine that a number of other individuals would be arrested during the period
as a result of special investigations into homicides, rape, and other victim
reported crimes.  But focusing only on the stop-and-frisks, we would have 5,005
new admissions to jail (and possibly prison).197
Naturally, we are assuming here that the “hit rates” reflect perfectly the
relative proportion of offenders in each racial group; that 2.02% of majority
young men and 4.95% of minority young men are offending in the targeted
population.  David Harris argues in Profiles in Injustice that the facts are other-
wise.  Harris emphasizes that the growing data on racial profiling demonstrate
that “[t]he rate at which officers uncover contraband in stops and searches is not
higher for blacks than for whites, as most people believe.” “Contrary to what
the ‘rational’ law enforcement justification for racial profiling would predict, the
hit rate for drugs and weapons in police searches of African Americans is the
same as or lower than the rate for whites.”198  And certainly, the experience in
New York confirms the lower hit rates.  According to New York State Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer, the rate at which stop-and-frisks turned into arrests—in
other words, the rate of stop-and-frisks that turned up evidence of criminal
behavior—differs by race.  During the period studied (January 1, 1998 through
March 31, 1999), for every one stop that would lead to an arrest, the New York
City Police Department stopped 9.5 African Americans, 8.8 Hispanics, and 7.9
197. This represents 9.1% of the existing prison and jail population, which would then only repre-
sent a fraction of the new admissions to jails and prisons.  In 1997, for instance, new court commitments
to state and federal prisons consisted of 365,085 persons out of a total state and federal prison popula-
tion of 1,194,581(or 30.56%); new admissions to state prisons in 1997 stood at 538,375 or 51.3% of the
state prison population at the beginning of the year.  See CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1997, supra
note 44, at pages 9–10, Tables 1.17 and 1.20.
198. HARRIS, supra note 39, at 13 (emphasis in original).
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European Americans.199  The rate of stops-to-arrest for stops conducted by the
Street Crime Unit is even more disproportionate: 16.3 for African Americans,
14.5 for Hispanics, and 9.6 for European Americans.200  However, for purposes
of this thought experiment, let us assume that the hit rate actually reflects the
assumed higher rates of offending among minorities.  Let’s assume that the
marginal reductions in hit rates in real life are an artifact of extremely dispro-
portionate racial profiling (above and beyond any possible difference in
offending rates).201  Let’s continue to take the racial profiling justification at face
value.
In fact, we can take the justification for racial profiling one step further and
assume a total and complete incapacitation effect associated with the profiling.
Let us assume that for every additional person incarcerated, there will be one
less person in that group committing crime.  Let’s assume pure one-for-one
incapacitation.  To compute the incapacitation effect, we need to determine
what would have obtained without racial profiling.  This is shown in the next
table:
TABLE 7:
RESULTS WITH RACIAL PROFILING
Category Total Majority Minority
Non-profiled stops 150,000 112,500 (75%) 37,500 (25%)
Non-profiled arrests and
admissions to jail/prison
4,125 2.02% of 112,500 or 2,269 4.95% of 37,500 or 1,856
Non-profiled admissions
percentage
100% 55% 45%
Difference in admissions
as a result of profiling
up 880 down 605 up 1,485
In other words, if we had not profiled—if we had not policed in proportion
to offending rates, but rather color-blind (with a large enough sample, in pro-
portion to group representation)—then there would have been 605 more
majorities arrested and 1,485 less minorities arrested.  If we assume that the
only increase in the jail population is due to the racial profiling, then total jail
admissions would have increased by 880 persons in that first year—a 1.6%
199. Spitzer, supra note 196, at 111.
200. Id. at 111–112, Table I.B.1.
201. For instance, if the highway patrols in 1992 stopped and searched 70% to 80% of African-
American and Hispanic drivers on the Florida interstate highway, yet these groups represent only 5%
of the drivers, there is bound to be disproportionately lower marginal hit rates for these groups.  See
Roberts, supra note 188, at 808–09.  See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Consti-
tution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 215–16, n.216 (2002) (suggesting that the data on relative hit rates
“say nothing at all about the empirical success or failure of racial profiling” and may be due simply to
overprediction on the basis of race).
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increase in the prison population.202  We could then use these numbers to calcu-
late how the incapacitation effect would reduce the rate of offending within the
minority community and increase the rate of offending within the majority
community.
TABLE 8:
HOW THE INCAPACITATION EFFECT WOULD REDUCE OFFENSE RATES
Total Majority Minority
“Criminal element”:
incarcerated population
less incapacitation effect
54,120 30,855 23,265
Percentage “criminal
element” by group
2.706% 2.057% 4.653%
If we assume a pure incapacitation effect, every additional minority person
incarcerated as a result of profiling would be one less potential offender: for
each additional minority offender incarcerated, we could reduce the “criminal
element” at large.  We could do the same for the majority community, but here,
of course, the “criminal element” would increase.  The result, naturally, would
be that the different offending rates within the different groups would shift
slightly during the course of the year: minority offending rates would decrease,
while majority offending rates would increase.
Let us assume that we continue each year to stop 150,000 young men 15 to
40, that we stop them using last year’s new incarceration breakdown as an accu-
rate representation of who is committing crimes, and that our hit rates take
account of the incapacitation effect.  Notice here that we are aggressively pur-
suing a proportional law enforcement strategy, using last year’s admissions
rather than the total incarcerated population (which would include the base
levels of 55,000 persons plus the net 880 new admissions).  Here is what hap-
pens in the next few years:
202. During the year 2001, the prison population in the United States grew 1.1%.  See PRISONERS IN
2001, supra note 3,  at 1.  By assuming that the prison population increased by only 880 persons (or
1.6%) in this thought experiment, what we are saying is that apart from the increase associated with
racial profiling, as many persons were admitted to prison as were released.  This is, of course, what
happens any time that the prison population remains stable over the course of a year.  For an idea of
admissions and releases, in the year 1997, 538,375 persons were admitted to state prisons and 489,914
were released from state prison, resulting in an increase in the state prison population of 48,461.  See
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, supra note 44, at 9.
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TABLE 9:
YEAR TWO
Categories Total Majority Minority
Stopped Population 150,000 49,863 (33.24%) 100,137 (66.76%)
New Admission
Population
5,685 2.057% of 49,863 or 1,026 4.653% of 100,137 or 4,659
New Admission
Percentage
100% 18.04% 81.96%
Non-profiled stops 150,000 112,500 (75%) 37,500 (25%)
Non-profiled arrests
and admissions to
jail/prison
4,125 2.02% of 112,500 or 2,269 4.95% of 37,500 or 1,856
Non-profiled
admissions percentage
100% 55% 45%
Difference in
admissions as a result
of profiling
up 1,560 down 1,243 up 2,803
“Criminal element”:
incarcerated
population less
incapacitation effect
52,560 32,098 20,462
Percentage “criminal
element” by group
2.63% 2.14% 4.09%
Notice that the new incarcerations are becoming more racially skewed:
almost 82% of the new admissions are minorities, whereas only about 18% are
majorities.  Notice also that the rate of offending within the minority group is
declining slightly as a result of the incapacitation effect associated with racial
profiling.  We are continuing to assume here that the only increase in the prison
population, here an increase of 1,560 (or 2.8% of the beginning year 55,880
prison population), is due to the racial profiling differential.  Putting aside that
differential, the same number of inmates are being released as persons are
being newly admitted.
Now let’s continue this thought experiment for three more years:
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TABLE 10:
YEAR THREE
Categories Total Majority Minority
Stopped Population 150,000 27,062 (18.04%) 122,938 (81.96%)
New Admission
Population
5,610 2.14% of 27,062 or 579 4.09% of 122,938 or 5,031
New Admission
Percentage
100% 10.32% 89.68%
Non-profiled stops 150,000 112,500 (75%) 37,500 (25%)
Non-profiled arrests
and admissions to
jail/prison
4,125 2.02% of 112,500 or 2,269 4.95% of 37,500 or 1,856
Non-profiled
admissions percentage
100% 55% 45%
Difference in
admissions as a result
of profiling
up 1,485 down 1,690 up 3,175
“Criminal element”:
incarcerated
population less
incapacitation effect
51,075 33,788 17,287
Percentage “criminal
element” by group
2.55% 2.25% 3.46%
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TABLE 11:
YEAR FOUR
Categories Total Majority Minority
Stopped Population 150,000 15,483 (10.32%) 134,517 (89.68%)
New Admission
Population
5,000 2.25% of 15,483 or 349 3.46% of 134,516 or 4,651
New Admission
Percentage
100% 6.98% 93.02%
Non-profiled stops 150,000 112,500 (75%) 37,500 (25%)
Non-profiled arrests
and admissions to
jail/prison
4,125 2.02% of 112,500 or 2,269 4.95% of 37,500 or 1,856
Non-profiled
admissions percentage
100% 55% 45%
Difference in
admissions as a result
of profiling
up 875 down 1,920 up 2,795
“Criminal element”:
incarcerated
population less
incapacitation effect
50,200 35,708 14,493
Percentage “criminal
element” by group
2.51% 2.38% 2.90%
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TABLE 12:
YEAR FIVE
Categories Total Majority Minority
Stopped Population 150,000 10,464 (6.98%) 139,536 (93.02%)
New Admission
Population
4,294 2.38% of 10,464 or 249 2.9% of 139,536 or 4,045
New Admission
Percentage
100% 5.8% 94.2%
Non-profiled stops 150,000 112,500 (75%) 37,500 (25%)
Non-profiled arrests
and admissions to
jail/prison
4,125 2.02% of 112,500 or 2,269 4.95% of 37,500 or 1,856
Non-profiled
admissions percentage
100% 55% 45%
Difference in
admissions as a result
of profiling
up 169 down 2,020 up 2,189
“Criminal element”:
incarcerated
population less
incapacitation effect
50,031 37,728 12,304
Percentage “criminal
element” by Group
2.51% 2.52% 2.46%
This experiment reveals two trends.  First, the efficiency of our stops is
increasing: each year, we are incarcerating more individuals based on the same
number of stops.  Second, the racial composition of the new incarceration
admissions is becoming increasingly disproportionate.  In other words, racial
profiling, assuming its premises and fixed law enforcement resources, may be a
self-confirming prophecy.  It likely aggravates over time the assumed correla-
tion between race and crime.  This could be called a “compound” or “multi-
plier” or “ratchet” effect of criminal profiling: profiling may have an accelerator
effect on disparities in the criminal justice system.
The important point of this thought experiment is that criminal profiling
accentuates the purported correlation even assuming that the underlying
assumptions are correct and that the practice is justifiable to some people.  If
the assumptions are wrong, criminal profiling will also be self-confirming.  The
same result—increased disproportionality in the racial balance of the incarcer-
ated population—would obtain if all racial groups had the same offending rate,
but we allocated increasingly more of our law enforcement resources to minori-
ties than their representation in the general population.  Excellent scholarship
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underscores this point: if you spend more time looking for crime in a subgroup,
you will find more crime there.203  My point here, though, is that the same type
of effect will likely occur even on the assumption of differential offending—even
if we accept fully the assumptions offered to justify racial profiling.  This is going
to be especially true for the more unreported types of crime such as drug pos-
session, gun carrying, or tax evasion.204
A few caveats are in order.  First, there may be a feedback effect working in
the opposite direction, assuming that actors know something about profiling
and respond rationally.205  In other words, different things may happen in
response to the reallocation of crime fighting dollars.  Persons in the targeted
group may begin to offend less because they are being targeted.  Persons in the
lower crime group may begin to offend more because of their immunity.  If so,
there may be a counter-effect, and one would expect that the two distributions
would begin to get closer to each other.  As a result, there would be three com-
peting forces at play: first, the ratchet effect, second, the incapacitation effect,
and third, the feedback effect.  The reason that I focus on the ratchet effect is
that it is logically entailed by criminal profiling.  It is, in this sense, necessary and
internal to profiling.  In contrast, the feedback effect is an indirect effect.  It is
mediated by mentalities.  It assumes dissemination of policing information and
rationality on the part of criminal offenders—questionable assumptions that
are, at the very least, likely to produce a more removed effect.
A second caveat is that I have focused exclusively on one variable—race and
ethnicity.  Police work rarely does this, and practically never does explicitly
anymore (outside international anti-terrorism policing).  But the analysis would
203. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 188, at 808–810.  This is also the sense in which David Harris
argues that racial profiling is a “self-fulfilling prophecy.”  HARRIS, supra note 39, at 223–25.  His argu-
ment is not that racial profiling is too effective.  On the contrary, he argues that the evidence demon-
strates it is ineffective and results in lower hit rates for minorities.  “Racial profiling is neither an
efficient nor an effective tool for fighting crime,” he writes at 79.  His argument that racial profiling is
nevertheless a self-fulfilling prophecy is, instead, that police will find crime wherever they look.  If they
spend more time in minority communities, they will find more crime there: “whom they catch depends
on where they look.”  Id. at 224.
204. Tax evasion is actually a very interesting case.  The IRS uses a “Discriminant Index Function”
(“DIF”) to detect false deductions.  “The DIF function is based on a secret formula, which in turn rep-
resents a regression on past audits to determine which factors are most likely to indicate cheating.  This
formula assigns a score to each return reflecting the estimated likelihood of noncompliance for that
taxpayer, based on the amounts stated on the return for each type of income and deduction.”  Certain
returns are then reviewed manually in order to choose returns to be examined. Depending upon the
problems detected on an examined return, the return will then be sent to an I.R.S. Service Center or
the I.R.S. district office. PRENTICE HALL 1991 FEDERAL TAX COURSE 1344–45 (1991).  Returns that
fit the profile of those that have a significant dollar amount of evasion are the most likely to be
examined.  JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES, 157 (2000).
205. This is going to be particularly true with more organized forms of criminality, such as more pro-
fessional illegal drug operations.  So, for example, if the head of a drug organization receives informa-
tion that police are profiling certain drivers on the interstate, it is likely that the organization will switch
couriers (so long, naturally, as there are available couriers with different profiles).  This suggests that
the feedback effect may depend on the organizational abilities of the criminal enterprise.  A central
premise of this thought experiment, though, is that the feedback effect is likely to be substantially
smaller than the ratchet effect because of scarce law enforcement resources and the plentiful nature of
crime—in other words, that the elasticity of crime to policing is extremely low.
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not differ if there were other variables.  There would be the same compounding
effect for each variable, with different directions of increased disproportional-
ity.  There is no a priori reason to believe that the different directions of bias
would cancel themselves out in any way—or would cancel out the effect on
race.
A final caveat is that this is a simplified model that focuses aggressively on
race and ethnicity and aggressively follows last year’s new incarceration rates.
Someone might respond that we would assume a fixed offending differential
(say 45% versus 55%) and continue to enforce criminal law in that proportion
regardless of the racial composition of new incarcerations.  But how would we
choose the original enforcement rate?  Would we use the 23.1% from 1926, the
45.8% from 1982, or the 51.8% from 1991?  Which one of these reflects a more
“natural” offending differential?  In what sense would any of them be more
reliable than the other?  More reliable than last year’s differential?  How far
back in history would we need to go to find the right differential?
The key point is that, under certain conditions, the ratchet effect is likely to
outweigh the feedback and incapacitation effects.  This is likely to be the case
when there is a healthy supply of criminal activity, limits on law enforcement
resources, and relatively unreliable natural offending rates.  Under these condi-
tions, targeting purportedly high-offending groups or neighborhoods is not
going to deplete the supply of criminal activity or significantly alter offending
rates, but instead ratchet the imbalance in the incarcerated population.  These
conditions likely characterize much of the crime and punishment field, espe-
cially illegal drug possession, gun carrying, and other lower-level street crimes,
as well as fraud and other larcenies.  Ultimately, the likely effect of criminal
profiling under these conditions is a compounding of the correlation between
the particular trait that is being profiled and the associated crime.
Using racial profiling as an illustration for criminal profiling is a double-
edged sword.  The advantage is that it facilitates engagement; we have all
become extremely agile at thinking about and debating racial profiling, espe-
cially since September 11, 2001.  At the same time, however, we tend to draw a
sharp distinction between racial profiling and other forms of criminal profiling.
Race is unique in American practice and discourse, and it raises exceptional his-
torical, political, and cultural dimensions.  I am using racial profiling as an
example, but what I have said about it should apply with equal force to other
types of profiling—whether it is profiling of disorderly people (squeegee men
and panhandlers), disaffected youth (trench coat mafia), domestic terrorists
(young to middle aged angry men), accounting defrauders (CEOs and CFOs),
or tax evaders (the wealthy).
What I am suggesting is that criminal profiling generally, in a world of finite
law enforcement resources, is likely to reshape offender distributions along the
specific trait that is being profiled, and this is likely to be the case whether the
criminal profiling is viewed by some as a legitimate reflection of differential
offending rates or instead the product of malicious selective enforcement—
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whether the underlying assumptions offered to justify criminal profiling are true
or false.  Wrongly or rightly, criminal profiling is likely to have a ratchet effect
that gradually reinforces the assumed crime correlations.
Has the gradual development of the actuarial approach in criminal justice
contributed to the growing racial imbalance in the carceral population?
Clearly, a combination of practices closely associated with criminal profiling has
contributed to these national trends.  These practices include drug interdiction
programs at ports of entry and on interstate highways, order-maintenance
crackdowns involving aggressive misdemeanor arrest policies, gun-oriented
policing in urban areas focusing on stop-and-frisk searches and increased
police–civilian contacts, as well as other instances of profiling ranging from
these drug-courier, street dealer, gang member, and disorderly profiles all the
way to profiles of disgruntled former federal employees or outcast and bullied
high school youths.  The investigatory search and seizure jurisprudence that has
grown out of Terry v. Ohio,206 especially cases such as Whren v. United States207—
in which the Supreme Court upheld the use of a pretextual civil traffic violation
as a basis for a stop-and-frisk procedure that was triggered by suspicion that the
driver and passenger were engaged in drug trafficking—has likely facilitated the
emergence of these practices.208
More research would be necessary to answer the question whether or to
what extent the refinement of the actuarial approach itself has contributed.  It
would be crucial to parse the data to explore which portion of the national
trends rely on offender differentials, or on targeted law enforcement
disproportionate to group representation, and to a possible multiplier effect, as
well as to measure any possible feedback and incapacitation effects.  Ultimately,
it may be necessary to explore and weigh the value of efficiency in criminal law.
The point of the previous thought experiment is that actuarial methods—
including criminal and especially racial profiling—may have contributed to the
national trends rightly or wrongly.  Many have argued wrongly, and if so, the
matter is clear: the wrongful profiling of individuals has no offsetting benefit.  It
is inefficient, discriminatory, and injurious.  But even if the underlying assump-
tions of profiling are right, there may nevertheless be adverse compounding
effects.  The targeting of groups for purposes of policing efficiency does more
than just improve efficiency; it may shape our social reality.
In his book Malign Neglect, Michael Tonry explains the logic of criminal
profiling.  It is, most often, he suggests, a question of efficiency:
There is another more powerful reason that the police focus their attention on the
inner city.  Both for individual officers and for departments, numbers of arrests made
have long been a measure of productivity and effectiveness.  If it takes more work and
206. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
207. 522 U.S. 1119 (1998).
208. See also, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (otherwise valid war-
rantless boarding of vessel by customs officials not rendered illegal by ulterior motive of accompanying
state police officer); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (traffic violation stop not rendered
illegal because pretext for drug search); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (same).
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longer to make a single drug arrest in Highland Park than in Woodlawn, the trade-off
may be between two arrests per month of an officer’s time in Highland Park and six
arrests per month in Woodlawn.  From the perspectives of the individual officer’s per-
sonnel record and the department’s year-to-year statistical comparisons, arrests are
fungible, and six arrests count for more than two.209
Efficiency, however, may not be the only product of criminal profiling.
Regardless of whether those six arrests are legitimate and proportional to
offending in those areas, the effect over time may be to aggravate the disparities
between Woodlawn and Highland Park, especially with regard to crimes like
drug or gun possession.  The actuarial approach may reshape reality.  In the
end, the decision to engage in criminal profiling is not just a matter of increased
law enforcement efficiency.  It involves a political and moral decision about the
type of world that we are creating.  There is a normative choice that needs to be
made.  The problem, if there is one, is certainly not the proliferation of printed
numbers, nor the identification of statistical regularity.  It is instead what we do
with the information.
V
CONCLUSION
One final question: Did the refinement of the actuarial model in criminal
law contribute to the larger theoretical shift during the twentieth century from
the individualization of punishment to incapacitation theory?  Is there some-
thing about the desire to model and verify that facilitates or promotes an inca-
pacitation approach?  In the parole case study, we observed a delicate shift
from using the new science of crime to find the right rehabilitative treatment to
using probabilities to predict success and failure on parole.  This is reflected in
the evolution from a rehabilitative aspiration, which was terribly hard to opera-
tionalize, to a functioning parole prediction system that was far more easily
operationalized.  Is it possible that the desire to operationalize and verify some-
how promoted this delicate shift?  Was the refinement of the actuarial methods
the product of the larger substantive theoretical change from individualization
to incapacitation—or did it instead contribute to that change, did it promote
that shift?
This is a challenging question and in exploring the question it will be impor-
tant to focus not only on the numbers, but also on the political and social sensi-
bilities that mark the turn of century.  Ian Hacking’s research suggests that the
proliferation of printed numbers alone was not enough to trigger the taming of
chance.  The probabilistic turn developed more in Western Europe (France and
England), and far less in Eastern Europe (Prussia) because of different political
sensibilities—the West being, crudely, more individualistic, atomistic, and liber-
tarian; the East being more community-oriented and collectivist.  These
sensibilities helped laws of chance flourish in the West, but inhibited their
development in the East.  “The Prussia that overthrew Napoleon created a
209. TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT, supra note 8, at 106–07.
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conception of society that resolutely resisted statistical generalization,” Hacking
writes.  “The Prussians created a powerful bureau but failed to achieve the idea
of statistical law.”210  The reason is that, in a world of collectivist sensibilities, the
laws of regularity are more likely to be associated with culture than with
individual behavior.  In contrast, in a more atomistic world guided by
Newtonian physics, social mathematics was more likely to flourish.  Thus,
Hacking concludes: “Without the avalanche of numbers set in motion by the
Duvillards, there would have been no idea of statistical laws of society.  But
without the a priori belief that there are Newtonian laws about people,
probabilistic laws would never have been read into those numbers.”211
Our research agenda, then, will need to focus not only on mathematical
computations, but also on moral, political, and intellectual sensibilities at the
turn of the twenty-first century.  How is it, after all, that purported correlations
between prior incarceration and future criminality have led us to profile prior
criminal history for purposes of sentencing and law enforcement, rather than to
conclude that there is a problem with prisons, punishment, or the lack of reen-
try programs?  What conclusions should we draw from the observation that cer-
tain groups may be offending at higher rates than others with regard to specific
crimes?  The numbers, the correlations, the actuarial methods themselves do
not answer the questions.  It is, again, what we do with the numbers that is far
more telling.
210. HACKING, supra note 47, at 35.
211. Id. at 46.
